linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 24/49] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH

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Message-ID: <CAMkAt6rV0GMuMwz35fEd19Z-mxXiiO6f2pF23QxTBD70Hzxf0Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 24 Jun 2022 08:42:46 -0600
From:   Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To:     Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
Cc:     "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-mm@...ck.org,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com>,
        "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>, jarkko@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 24/49] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command

>
> +19. KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START
> +------------------------
> +
> +The KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
> +context for the SEV-SNP guest. To create the encryption context, user must
> +provide a guest policy, migration agent (if any) and guest OS visible
> +workarounds value as defined SEV-SNP specification.
> +
> +Parameters (in): struct  kvm_snp_launch_start
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
> +::
> +
> +        struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
> +                __u64 policy;           /* Guest policy to use. */
> +                __u64 ma_uaddr;         /* userspace address of migration agent */
> +                __u8 ma_en;             /* 1 if the migtation agent is enabled */

migration

> +                __u8 imi_en;            /* set IMI to 1. */
> +                __u8 gosvw[16];         /* guest OS visible workarounds */
> +        };
> +
> +See the SEV-SNP specification for further detail on the launch input.
> +
>  References
>  ==========
>

>
> +static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> +       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +       struct sev_data_snp_decommission data = {};
> +       int ret;
> +
> +       /* If context is not created then do nothing */
> +       if (!sev->snp_context)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       data.gctx_paddr = __sme_pa(sev->snp_context);
> +       ret = snp_guest_decommission(&data, NULL);

Do we have a similar race like in sev_unbind_asid() with DEACTIVATE
and WBINVD/DF_FLUSH? The SNP_DECOMMISSION spec looks quite similar to
DEACTIVATE.

> +       if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to release guest context"))
> +               return ret;
> +
> +       /* free the context page now */
> +       snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
> +       sev->snp_context = NULL;
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
>  void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>  {
>         struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;