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Date:   Fri, 24 Jun 2022 09:12:20 -0600
From:   Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To:     Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
Cc:     "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-mm@...ck.org,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com>,
        "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>, jarkko@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 35/49] KVM: SVM: Remove the long-lived GHCB host map

On Mon, Jun 20, 2022 at 5:11 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com> wrote:
>
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>
> On VMGEXIT, sev_handle_vmgexit() creates a host mapping for the GHCB GPA,
> and unmaps it just before VM-entry. This long-lived GHCB map is used by
> the VMGEXIT handler through accessors such as ghcb_{set_get}_xxx().
>
> A long-lived GHCB map can cause issue when SEV-SNP is enabled. When
> SEV-SNP is enabled the mapped GPA needs to be protected against a page
> state change.
>
> To eliminate the long-lived GHCB mapping, update the GHCB sync operations
> to explicitly map the GHCB before access and unmap it after access is
> complete. This requires that the setting of the GHCBs sw_exit_info_{1,2}
> fields be done during sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(), so create two new fields in
> the vcpu_svm struct to hold these values when required to be set outside
> of the GHCB mapping.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  12 ++--
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  24 +++++++-
>  3 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 01ea257e17d6..c70f3f7e06a8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2823,15 +2823,40 @@ void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>         kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
>  }
>
> +static inline int svm_map_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_host_map *map)
> +{
> +       struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
> +       u64 gfn = gpa_to_gfn(control->ghcb_gpa);
> +
> +       if (kvm_vcpu_map(&svm->vcpu, gfn, map)) {
> +               /* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
> +               pr_err("error mapping GHCB GFN [%#llx] from guest\n", gfn);
> +               return -EFAULT;
> +       }
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}

There is a perf cost to this suggestion but it might make accessing
the GHCB safer for KVM. Have you thought about just using
kvm_read_guest() or copy_from_user() to fully copy out the GCHB into a
KVM owned buffer, then copying it back before the VMRUN. That way the
KVM doesn't need to guard against page_state_changes on the GHCBs,
that could be a perf improvement in a follow up.

Since we cannot unmap GHCBs I don't think UPM will help here so we
probably want to make these patches safe against malicious guests
making GHCBs private. But maybe UPM does help?

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