linux-kernel - Re: [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: Call depth tracking mitigation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <YtX5enG0eN1XUzGR@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date:   Tue, 19 Jul 2022 02:23:22 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
        Joao Moreira <joao@...rdrivepizza.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        "Cooper, Andrew" <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
        Johannes Wikner <kwikner@...z.ch>,
        Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
        "Moreira, Joao" <joao.moreira@...el.com>,
        "Nuzman, Joseph" <joseph.nuzman@...el.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        "Gross, Jurgen" <jgross@...e.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: Call depth tracking mitigation

On Mon, Jul 18, 2022 at 05:11:27PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2022 at 5:03 PM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > So it already only adds the pattern to things that have their address
> > taken, not all functions?
> >
> > If so, that's simple enough to sort out: don't do any RSB stack
> > adjustment for those thunks AT ALL.
> >
> > Because they should just then end up with a jump to the "real" target,
> > and that real target will do the RSB stack thing.
> 
> Put another way, let's say that you have a function that looks like this:
> 
>   int silly(void)
>   {
>        return 0;
>   }
> 
> and now you have two cases:
> 
>  - the "direct callable version" of that function looks exactly the
> way it always has looked, and gets the 16 bytes of padding for it, and
> the RSB counting can happen in that padding
> 
>  - the "somebody took the address of this function" creates code that
> has the hash marker before it, and has the hash check, and then does a
> "jmp silly" to actually jump to the real code.
> 
> So what the RSB counting does is just ignore that second case entirely
> as far as the RSB code generation goes. No need to have any padding
> for it at all, it has that (completely different) kCFI padding
> instead.
> 
> Instead, only the "real" silly function gets that RSB code, and the
> "jmp silly" from the kCFI thunk needs to be updated to point to the
> RSB thunk in front of it.
> 
> Yes, yes, it makes indirect calls slightly more expensive than direct
> calls (because that kCFI thing can't just fall through to the real
> thing), but considering all the *other* costs of indirect calls, the
> cost of having that one "jmp" instruction doesn't really seem to
> matter, does it?

So it's like 2:15 am here, so I might not be following things right, but
doesn't the above mean you have to play funny games with what a function
pointer is?

That is, the content of a function pointer (address taken) no longer
match the actual function? That gives grief with things like
static_call(), ftrace and other things that write call instructions
instead of doing indirect calls.