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Message-ID: <20220725130417.GA304216@chaop.bj.intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 25 Jul 2022 21:04:17 +0800
From:   Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, qemu-devel@...gnu.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
        "Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, david@...hat.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
        ddutile@...hat.com, dhildenb@...hat.com,
        Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, mhocko@...e.com,
        Muchun Song <songmuchun@...edance.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 11/14] KVM: Register/unregister the guest private
 memory regions

On Thu, Jul 21, 2022 at 05:58:50PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2022 at 03:34:59PM +0800, Wei Wang wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On 7/21/22 00:21, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > Maybe you could tag it with cgs for all the confidential guest support
> > > related stuff: e.g. kvm_vm_ioctl_set_cgs_mem()
> > > 
> > > bool is_private = ioctl == KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION;
> > > ...
> > > kvm_vm_ioctl_set_cgs_mem(, is_private)
> > 
> > If we plan to widely use such abbr. through KVM (e.g. it's well known),
> > I'm fine.
> 
> I'd prefer to stay away from "confidential guest", and away from any VM-scoped
> name for that matter.  User-unmappable memmory has use cases beyond hiding guest
> state from the host, e.g. userspace could use inaccessible/unmappable memory to
> harden itself against unintentional access to guest memory.
> 
> > I actually use mem_attr in patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/7/20/610
> > But I also don't quite like it, it's so generic and sounds say nothing.
> > 
> > But I do want a name can cover future usages other than just 
> > private/shared (pKVM for example may have a third state).
> 
> I don't think there can be a third top-level state.  Memory is either private to
> the guest or it's not.  There can be sub-states, e.g. memory could be selectively
> shared or encrypted with a different key, in which case we'd need metadata to
> track that state.
> 
> Though that begs the question of whether or not private_fd is the correct
> terminology.  E.g. if guest memory is backed by a memfd that can't be mapped by
> userspace (currently F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE), but something else in the kernel plugs
> that memory into a device or another VM, then arguably that memory is shared,
> especially the multi-VM scenario.
> 
> For TDX and SNP "private vs. shared" is likely the correct terminology given the
> current specs, but for generic KVM it's probably better to align with whatever
> terminology is used for memfd.  "inaccessible_fd" and "user_inaccessible_fd" are
> a bit odd since the fd itself is accesible.
> 
> What about "user_unmappable"?  E.g.
> 
>   F_SEAL_USER_UNMAPPABLE, MFD_USER_UNMAPPABLE, KVM_HAS_USER_UNMAPPABLE_MEMORY,
>   MEMFILE_F_USER_INACCESSIBLE, user_unmappable_fd, etc...

For KVM I also think user_unmappable looks better than 'private', e.g.
user_unmappable_fd/KVM_HAS_USER_UNMAPPABLE_MEMORY sounds more
appropriate names. For memfd however, I don't feel that strong to change
it from current 'inaccessible' to 'user_unmappable', one of the reason
is it's not just about unmappable, but actually also inaccessible
through direct ioctls like read()/write().

> 
> that gives us flexibility to map the memory from within the kernel, e.g. into
> other VMs or devices.
> 
> Hmm, and then keep your original "mem_attr_array" name?  And probably 
> 
>  int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, gpa_t size,
>  			       bool is_user_mappable)
> 
> Then the x86/mmu code for TDX/SNP private faults could be:
> 
> 	is_private = !kvm_is_gpa_user_mappable();
> 
> 	if (fault->is_private != is_private) {
> 
> or if we want to avoid mixing up "user_mappable" and "user_unmappable":
> 
> 	is_private = kvm_is_gpa_user_unmappable();
> 
> 	if (fault->is_private != is_private) {
> 
> though a helper that returns a negative (not mappable) feels kludgy.  And I like
> kvm_is_gpa_user_mappable() because then when there's not "special" memory, it
> defaults to true, which is more intuitive IMO.

yes.

> 
> And then if the future needs more precision, e.g. user-unmappable memory isn't
> necessarily guest-exclusive, the uAPI names still work even though KVM internals
> will need to be reworked, but that's unavoidable.  E.g. piggybacking
> KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_(UN)REG_REGION doesn't allow for further differentiation,
> so we'd need to _extend_ the uAPI, but the _existing_ uAPI would still be sane.

Right, that has to be extended.

Chao

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