lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <Yuo59tV071/i6yhf@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 3 Aug 2022 11:03:50 +0200
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Robert O'Callahan <robert@...llahan.org>,
        David Manouchehri <david.manouchehri@...eup.net>,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Allow PKRU to be (once again) written by ptrace.


* Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com> wrote:

> From: Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>
> 
> When management of the PKRU register was moved away from XSTATE, emulation
> of PKRU's existence in XSTATE was added for APIs that read XSTATE, but not
> for APIs that write XSTATE. This can be seen by running gdb and executing
> `p $pkru`, `set $pkru = 42`, and `p $pkru`. On affected kernels (5.14+) the
> write to the PKRU register (which gdb performs through ptrace) is ignored.
> 
> There are three relevant APIs: PTRACE_SETREGSET with NT_X86_XSTATE,
> sigreturn, and KVM_SET_XSAVE. KVM_SET_XSAVE has its own special handling to
> make PKRU writes take effect (in fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate). Push that
> down into copy_uabi_to_xstate and have PTRACE_SETREGSET with NT_X86_XSTATE
> and sigreturn pass in pointers to the appropriate PKRU value.
> 
> This also adds code to initialize the PKRU value to the hardware init value
> (namely 0) if the PKRU bit is not set in the XSTATE header to match XRSTOR.
> This is a change to the current KVM_SET_XSAVE behavior.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>
> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org # For edge case behavior of KVM_SET_XSAVE
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 5.14+
> Fixes: e84ba47e313dbc097bf859bb6e4f9219883d5f78
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c   | 11 +----------
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h |  4 ++--
>  5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
> index 0531d6a06df5..dfb79e2ee81f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
> @@ -406,16 +406,7 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf,
>  	if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~xcr0)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> -	ret = copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(kstate, ustate);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -
> -	/* Retrieve PKRU if not in init state */
> -	if (kstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) {
> -		xpkru = get_xsave_addr(&kstate->regs.xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU);
> -		*vpkru = xpkru->pkru;
> -	}
> -	return 0;
> +	return copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(kstate, ustate, vpkru);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_KVM */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
> index 75ffaef8c299..6d056b68f4ed 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
> @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
>  	}
>  
>  	fpu_force_restore(fpu);
> -	ret = copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(fpu->fpstate, kbuf ?: tmpbuf);
> +	ret = copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(fpu->fpstate, kbuf ?: tmpbuf, &target->thread.pkru);
>  
>  out:
>  	vfree(tmpbuf);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> index 91d4b6de58ab..558076dbde5b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static bool __fpu_restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx,
>  
>  	fpregs = &fpu->fpstate->regs;
>  	if (use_xsave() && !fx_only) {
> -		if (copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(fpu->fpstate, buf_fx))
> +		if (copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(tsk, buf_fx))
>  			return false;
>  	} else {
>  		if (__copy_from_user(&fpregs->fxsave, buf_fx,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> index c8340156bfd2..1eea7af4afd9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int copy_from_buffer(void *dst, unsigned int offset, unsigned int size,
>  
>  
>  static int copy_uabi_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf,
> -			       const void __user *ubuf)
> +			       const void __user *ubuf, u32 *pkru)
>  {
>  	struct xregs_state *xsave = &fpstate->regs.xsave;
>  	unsigned int offset, size;
> @@ -1235,6 +1235,22 @@ static int copy_uabi_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf,
>  	for (i = 0; i < XFEATURE_MAX; i++) {
>  		mask = BIT_ULL(i);
>  
> +		if (i == XFEATURE_PKRU) {
> +			/*
> +			 * Retrieve PKRU if not in init state, otherwise
> +			 * initialize it.
> +			 */
> +			if (hdr.xfeatures & mask) {
> +				struct pkru_state xpkru = {0};
> +
> +				copy_from_buffer(&xpkru, xstate_offsets[i],
> +						 sizeof(xpkru), kbuf, ubuf);

Shouldn't the failure case of copy_from_buffer() be handled?

Also, what's the security model for this register, do we trust all input 
values user-space provides for the PKRU field in the XSTATE? I realize that 
WRPKRU already gives user-space write access to the register - but does the 
CPU write it all into the XSTATE, with no restrictions on content 
whatsoever?

Thanks,

	Ingo

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ