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Date:   Tue, 13 Sep 2022 14:52:40 -0500
From:   "Suthikulpanit, Suravee" <suravee.suthikulpanit@....com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
        Li RongQing <lirongqing@...du.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/23] KVM: x86: Inhibit AVIC SPTEs if any vCPU enables
 x2APIC

Sean,

This patch inhibits VM running in x2APIC mode on system w/ x2AVIC support.

On 9/2/2022 7:22 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Reintroduce APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC as a "partial" inhibit for AMD
> to fix a bug where the APIC access page is visible to vCPUs that have
> x2APIC enabled, i.e. shouldn't be able to "see" the xAPIC MMIO region.
> 
> On AMD, due to its "hybrid" mode where AVIC is enabled when x2APIC is
> enabled even without x2AVIC support, the bug occurs any time AVIC is
> enabled as x2APIC is fully emulated by KVM.  I.e. hardware isn't aware
> that the guest is operating in x2APIC mode.
> 
> Opportunistically drop the "can" while updating avic_activate_vmcb()'s
> comment, i.e. to state that KVM _does_ support the hybrid mode.  Move
> the "Note:" down a line to conform to preferred kernel/KVM multi-line
> comment style.
> 
> Leave Intel as-is for now to avoid a subtle performance regression, even
> though Intel likely suffers from the same bug.  On Intel, in theory the
> bug rears its head only when vCPUs share host page tables (extremely
> likely) and x2APIC enabling is not consistent within the guest, i.e. if
> some vCPUs have x2APIC enabled and other does do not (unlikely to occur
> except in certain situations, e.g. bringing up APs).
> 
> Fixes: 0e311d33bfbe ("KVM: SVM: Introduce hybrid-AVIC mode")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 10 ++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c            |  4 +++-
>   arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          |  2 +-
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c         | 15 +++++++-------
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>   5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 2c96c43c313a..1fd1b66ceeb6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1132,6 +1132,15 @@ enum kvm_apicv_inhibit {
>   	 * AVIC is disabled because SEV doesn't support it.
>   	 */
>   	APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV,
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Due to sharing page tables across vCPUs, the xAPIC memslot must be
> +	 * inhibited if any vCPU has x2APIC enabled.  Note, this is a "partial"
> +	 * inhibit; APICv can still be activated, but KVM mustn't retain/create
> +	 * SPTEs for the APIC access page.  Like the APIC ID and APIC base
> +	 * inhibits, this is sticky for simplicity.
> +	 */
> +	APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC,

Actually, shouldn't the APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC is set only when 
vCPU has x2APIC enabled on the system with _NO x2AVIC support_ ? For 
example, .....

>   };
>   
>   struct kvm_arch {
> @@ -1903,6 +1912,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
>   gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
>   				struct x86_exception *exception);
>   
> +bool kvm_apicv_memslot_activated(struct kvm *kvm);
>   bool kvm_apicv_activated(struct kvm *kvm);
>   bool kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>   void kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> index 38e9b8e5278c..d956cd37908e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> @@ -2394,8 +2394,10 @@ void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value)
>   		}
>   	}
>   
> -	if (((old_value ^ value) & X2APIC_ENABLE) && (value & X2APIC_ENABLE))
> +	if (((old_value ^ value) & X2APIC_ENABLE) && (value & X2APIC_ENABLE)) {
>   		kvm_apic_set_x2apic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
> +		kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC);
> +	}

.... Here, since we do not want to inhibit APICV/AVIC on system that can 
support x2AVIC, this should be set in the vendor-specific call-back 
function, where appropriate checks can be made.

>   
>   	if ((old_value ^ value) & (MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE)) {
>   		kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index e418ef3ecfcb..cea25552869f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -4150,7 +4150,7 @@ static int kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
>   		 * when the AVIC is re-enabled.
>   		 */
>   		if (slot && slot->id == APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT &&
> -		    !kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm))
> +		    !kvm_apicv_memslot_activated(vcpu->kvm))
>   			return RET_PF_EMULATE;
>   	}
>   
> ....
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index d7374d768296..6ab9088c2531 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -9379,15 +9379,29 @@ static void kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(struct kvm *kvm, int apicid)
>   	kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(kvm, NULL, &lapic_irq, NULL);
>   }
>   
> -bool kvm_apicv_activated(struct kvm *kvm)
> +bool kvm_apicv_memslot_activated(struct kvm *kvm)
>   {
>   	return (READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons) == 0);
>   }
> +
> +static unsigned long kvm_apicv_get_inhibit_reasons(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * x2APIC only needs to "inhibit" the MMIO region, all other aspects of
> +	 * APICv can continue to be utilized.
> +	 */
> +	return READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons) & ~APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC;
> +}
> +
> +bool kvm_apicv_activated(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> +	return !kvm_apicv_get_inhibit_reasons(kvm);
> +}
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apicv_activated);
>   
>   bool kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   {
> -	ulong vm_reasons = READ_ONCE(vcpu->kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons);
> +	ulong vm_reasons = kvm_apicv_get_inhibit_reasons(vcpu->kvm);
>   	ulong vcpu_reasons = static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(vcpu);
>   
>   	return (vm_reasons | vcpu_reasons) == 0;
> @@ -10122,7 +10136,15 @@ void __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(struct kvm *kvm,
>   
>   	set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(&new, reason, set);
>   
> -	if (!!old != !!new) {
> +	/*
> +	 * If the overall "is APICv activated" status is unchanged, simply add
> +	 * or remove the inihbit from the pile.  x2APIC is an exception, as it
> +	 * is a partial inhibit (only blocks SPTEs for the APIC access page).
> +	 * If x2APIC is the only inhibit in either the old or the new set, then
> +	 * vCPUs need to be kicked to transition between partially-inhibited
> +	 * and fully-inhibited.
> +	 */
> +	if ((!!old != !!new) || old == X2APIC_ENABLE || new == X2APIC_ENABLE) {

Why are we comparing APICV inhibit reasons (old, new) with X2APIC_ENABLE 
here? Do you mean to compare with APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC?

Thanks,
Suravee

>   		/*
>   		 * Kick all vCPUs before setting apicv_inhibit_reasons to avoid
>   		 * false positives in the sanity check WARN in svm_vcpu_run().
> @@ -10137,7 +10159,12 @@ void __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(struct kvm *kvm,
>   		 */
>   		kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE);
>   		kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons = new;
> -		if (new) {
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Zap SPTEs for the APIC access page if APICv is newly
> +		 * inhibited (partially or fully).
> +		 */
> +		if (new && !old) {
>   			unsigned long gfn = gpa_to_gfn(APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE);
>   			kvm_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gfn, gfn+1);
>   		}

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