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Message-ID: <556b21f9-56ae-7ff6-c38a-9ca856438a66@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2022 06:54:00 -0400
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, serge@...lyn.com, brauner@...nel.org,
containers@...ts.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
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roberto.sassu@...wei.com, mpeters@...hat.com, lhinds@...hat.com,
lsturman@...hat.com, puiterwi@...hat.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
jamjoom@...ibm.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
paul@...l-moore.com, rgb@...hat.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
jpenumak@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 00/26] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns
On 9/15/22 20:56, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 9/15/2022 12:31 PM, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of
>> IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first
>> step.
>>
>> In this series the IMA namespace is piggybacking on the user namespace
>> and therefore an IMA namespace is created when a user namespace is
>> created, although this is done late when SecurityFS is mounted inside
>> a user namespace. The advantage of piggybacking on the user namespace
>> is that the user namespace can provide the keys infrastructure that IMA
>> appraisal support will need later on.
>>
>> We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it
>> requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within
>> an IMA namespace can be activated by a root running the following lines
>> that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for
>> execution within the minimal container environment:
>>
>> As root (since audit rules may now only be set by root):
>
> How about calling out the required capabilities? You don't need
> to be root, you need a specific set of capabilities. It would be
> very useful for the purposes of understanding the security value
> of the patch set to know this.
>
CAP_AUDIT_WRITE?
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