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Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2022 17:56:32 -0700 From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org Cc: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, serge@...lyn.com, brauner@...nel.org, containers@...ts.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com, krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com, mpeters@...hat.com, lhinds@...hat.com, lsturman@...hat.com, puiterwi@...hat.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com, jamjoom@...ibm.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, rgb@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org, jpenumak@...hat.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 00/26] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns On 9/15/2022 12:31 PM, Stefan Berger wrote: > The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of > IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first > step. > > In this series the IMA namespace is piggybacking on the user namespace > and therefore an IMA namespace is created when a user namespace is > created, although this is done late when SecurityFS is mounted inside > a user namespace. The advantage of piggybacking on the user namespace > is that the user namespace can provide the keys infrastructure that IMA > appraisal support will need later on. > > We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it > requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within > an IMA namespace can be activated by a root running the following lines > that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for > execution within the minimal container environment: > > As root (since audit rules may now only be set by root): How about calling out the required capabilities? You don't need to be root, you need a specific set of capabilities. It would be very useful for the purposes of understanding the security value of the patch set to know this.
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