linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] Fix race condition when exec'ing setuid files

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Message-ID: <a9588d9e-56a1-666c-9542-35bd0c8f64af@canonical.com>
Date:   Sun, 18 Sep 2022 18:27:31 -0300
From:   Jorge Merlino <jorge.merlino@...onical.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
        Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
        Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>,
        Valentin Schneider <vschneid@...hat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix race condition when exec'ing setuid files


El 13/9/22 a las 19:03, Kees Cook escribió:
> Thanks for reporting this and for having a reproducer!
> 
> It looks like this is "failing safe", in the sense that the bug causes
> an exec of a setuid binary to not actually change the euid. Is that an
> accurate understanding here?

Yes, that is correct.

>> This patch sort of fixes this by setting a process flag to the parent
>> process during the time this race is possible. Thus, if a process is
>> forking, it counts an extra user fo the fs_struct as the counter might be
>> incremented before the thread is visible. But this is not great as this
>> could generate the opposite problem as there may be an external process
>> sharing the fs_struct that is masked by some thread that is being counted
>> twice. I submit this patch just as an idea but mainly I want to introduce
>> this issue and see if someone comes up with a better solution.
> 
> I'll want to spend some more time studying this race, but yes, it looks
> like it should get fixed. I'm curious, though, how did you find this
> problem? It seems quite unusual to have a high-load heavily threaded
> process decide to exec.

It was reported to Canonical by a customer. I don't know exactly the 
circumstances where they see this problem occur in production.

Thanks
	Jorge