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Message-ID: <202209231126.6855D54@keescook>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 11:31:37 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@...ck-us.net>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mm+efi: Avoid creating W+X mappings
On Fri, Sep 23, 2022 at 04:26:58PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> I was basically making the point that we still support i386 without
> PAE (which is a prerequisite for supporting non-executable mappings),
> and if we are going to be pedantic about security on this
> architecture, we should probably make PAE mandatory as well.
My expectation would be that if someone is running modern kernels on i386,
they're not using PAE. If they care about PAE, I'd expect them to have
long since moved to x86_64.
> If we are ok with the current state, enabling this permission check on
> i386 makes no sense.
I'd agree. If it's a choice between "spend a lot of time making sure
this works correctly on i386" and "don't do this at all on i386", I
would pick the latter. If someone steps up to do the former, then by
all means take the patches.
--
Kees Cook
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