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Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2022 15:40:18 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
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Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 18/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
* Andrew Cooper:
> On 10/10/2022 13:33, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> * Andrew Cooper:
>>
>>> You don't actually need a hole to create a guard. Any mapping of type
>>> != shstk will do.
>>>
>>> If you've got a load of threads, you can tightly pack stack / shstk /
>>> stack / shstk with no holes, and they each act as each other guard pages.
>> Can userspace read the shadow stack directly? Writing is obviously
>> blocked, but reading?
>
> Yes - regular reads are permitted to shstk memory.
>
> It's actually a great way to get backtraces with no extra metadata
> needed.
Indeed, I hope shadow stacks can be used to put the discussion around
frame pointers to a rest, at least when it comes to profiling. 8-)
>> POSIX does not appear to require PROT_NONE mappings
>> for the stack guard region, either. However, the
>> pthread_attr_setguardsize manual page pretty clearly says that it's got
>> to be unreadable and unwriteable. Hence my question.
>
> Hmm. If that's what the manuals say, then fine.
>
> But honestly, you don't get very far at all without faulting on a
> read-only stack.
I guess we can update the manual page proactively. It does look like a
tempting optimization.
Thanks,
Florian
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