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Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 16:11:03 +0800
From: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@...wei.com>
To: <rostedt@...dmis.org>, <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <zhengyejian1@...wei.com>
Subject: [BUG] tracing: Possible data race on global variable 'trace_probe_log'
Hi,
I found a possible data race bug in trace probe log when looking into the
code, I currently don't have a good solution but I'll be glad to fix it.
kprobe/uprobe/eprobe call below interfaces to print logs into 'error_log':
trace_probe_log_init()
trace_probe_log_clear()
trace_probe_log_set_index()
__trace_probe_log_err()
These interfaces access global variable 'trace_probe_log' without any
concurrency protection, then concurrently access 'trace_probe_log.argv' in
__trace_probe_log_err() may cause kernel oops [1] [2].
To solve this problem, we can add a mutex lock (see demo code below), but
it doesn't look so good to add such a big lock just for log print.
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
index 36dff277de46..e6e8e6002546 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
@@ -142,17 +142,22 @@ static const struct fetch_type *find_fetch_type(const char *type)
static struct trace_probe_log trace_probe_log;
+DEFINE_MUTEX(trace_probe_log_mutex);
+
void trace_probe_log_init(const char *subsystem, int argc, const char **argv)
{
+ mutex_lock(&trace_probe_log_mutex);
trace_probe_log.subsystem = subsystem;
trace_probe_log.argc = argc;
trace_probe_log.argv = argv;
trace_probe_log.index = 0;
}
void trace_probe_log_clear(void)
{
memset(&trace_probe_log, 0, sizeof(trace_probe_log));
+ mutex_unlock(&trace_probe_log_mutex);
}
Another possible solution, we can define a stack varible to hold trace_probe_log
arguments in __trace_{k,u,e}probe_create() then pass it to every caller of
trace_probe_log_err(). But it may look a little ugly.
[1] Shell script to reproduce:
# 'p4' is invalid command which make kernel run into trace_probe_log_err()
cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
while true; do
echo 'p4:myprobe1 do_sys_openat2 dfd=%ax filename=%dx flags=%cx mode=+4($stack)' >> kprobe_events &
echo 'p4:myprobe2 do_sys_openat2' >> kprobe_events &
echo 'p4:myprobe3 do_sys_openat2 dfd=%ax filename=%dx' >> kprobe_events &
done;
[2] Reproduction log:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address I
[ 407.244517] CPU: 6 PID: 20830 Comm: xx.sh Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc6 #143
[ 407.244517] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4
[ 407.244517] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x4b/0x110
[ 407.244517] Code: 80 48 01 e8 0f 82 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 37 70 3b 016
[ 407.244517] RSP: 0018:ffff936442d4bde0 EFLAGS: 00000207
[ 407.244517] RAX: 01b960a8019881c0 RBX: ffff89fa031068e8 RCX: 00000000000a6e86
[ 407.244517] RDX: 0000760680000000 RSI: ffffffff9dfc056d RDI: 6e656c6966207861
[ 407.244517] RBP: 6e656c6966207861 R08: 00000000ffffffea R09: 0000000000000000
[ 407.244517] R10: ffff89fa060aa4e8 R11: ffffc91e44153d08 R12: 00000000ffffffea
[ 407.244517] R13: ffffffff9d5a0240 R14: ffff89fa031f9000 R15: ffff89fa031f9000
[ 407.244517] FS: 00007f9f34691740(0000) GS:ffff89fa3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 407.244517] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 407.244517] CR2: 00007f9f3470a860 CR3: 0000000100b94000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 407.244517] Call Trace:
[ 407.244517] <TASK>
[ 407.244517] argv_free+0xd/0x20
[ 407.244517] ? print_kprobe_event+0x190/0x190
[ 407.244517] trace_probe_create+0x4f/0x90
[ 407.244517] create_or_delete_trace_kprobe+0x11/0x40
[ 407.244517] trace_parse_run_command+0xaa/0x130
[ 407.244517] vfs_write+0xc6/0x3c0
[ 407.244517] ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x57/0x60
[ 407.244517] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[ 407.244517] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 407.244517] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 407.244517] RIP: 0033:0x7f9f347a2077
[ 407.244517] Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 644
[ 407.244517] RSP: 002b:00007ffd03965d18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 407.244517] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 00007f9f347a2077
[ 407.244517] RDX: 000000000000001b RSI: 0000563d529db570 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 407.244517] RBP: 0000563d529db570 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 000000000000001a
[ 407.244517] R10: 0000563d51deb017 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000001b
[ 407.244517] R13: 00007f9f348816a0 R14: 00007f9f3487d4a0 R15: 00007f9f3487c8a0
[ 407.244517] </TASK>
[ 407.244517] Modules linked in:
[ 407.265327] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 407.267380] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x4b/0x110
[ 407.268251] Code: 80 48 01 e8 0f 82 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 37 70 3b 016
[ 407.269811] RSP: 0018:ffff936442d4bde0 EFLAGS: 00000207
[ 407.270239] RAX: 01b960a8019881c0 RBX: ffff89fa031068e8 RCX: 00000000000a6e86
[ 407.270885] RDX: 0000760680000000 RSI: ffffffff9dfc056d RDI: 6e656c6966207861
[ 407.272507] RBP: 6e656c6966207861 R08: 00000000ffffffea R09: 0000000000000000
[ 407.273110] R10: ffff89fa060aa4e8 R11: ffffc91e44153d08 R12: 00000000ffffffea
[ 407.273773] R13: ffffffff9d5a0240 R14: ffff89fa031f9000 R15: ffff89fa031f9000
[ 407.274161] FS: 00007f9f34691740(0000) GS:ffff89fa3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 407.274806] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 407.275201] CR2: 00007f9f3470a860 CR3: 0000000100b94000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 407.276197] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 407.276792] Kernel Offset: 0x1c400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffff)
[ 407.276792] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
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