linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/bugs: Use Virtual MSRs to request hardware mitigations

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Mon, 12 Dec 2022 12:23:34 -0800
From:   Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@...el.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/bugs: Use Virtual MSRs to request hardware
 mitigations

On Sun, Dec 11, 2022 at 12:00:42AM +0800, Zhang Chen wrote:
> From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
> 
> Guests that have different family/model than the host may not be aware
> of hardware mitigations(such as RRSBA_DIS_S) available on host. This is
> particularly true when guests migrate. To solve this problem Intel
> processors have added a virtual MSR interface through which guests can
> report their mitigation status and request VMM to deploy relevant
> hardware mitigations.
> 
> Use this virtualized MSR interface to request relevant hardware controls
> for retpoline mitigation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index 1143ac9400c3..1166b472377c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@
>  						 * IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR
>  						 * supported
>  						 */
> +#define ARCH_CAP_VIRTUAL_ENUM		BIT(63)	/* MSR_VIRTUAL_ENUMERATION supported */
>  
>  #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
>  #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
> @@ -1062,6 +1063,28 @@
>  #define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_INTEL_PT                 (1ULL << 14)
>  #define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_VMWRITE_SHADOW_RO_FIELDS (1ULL << 29)
>  #define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_SCALE   0x1F
> +
> +/* Intel virtual MSRs */
> +#define MSR_VIRTUAL_ENUMERATION			0x50000000
> +#define VIRT_ENUM_MITIGATION_CTRL_SUPPORT	BIT(0)	/*
> +							 * Mitigation ctrl via virtual
> +							 * MSRs supported
> +							 */
> +
> +#define MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_ENUM		0x50000001
> +#define MITI_ENUM_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_SUPPORT	BIT(0)	/* VMM supports BHI_DIS_S */
> +#define MITI_ENUM_RETPOLINE_S_SUPPORT		BIT(1)	/* VMM supports RRSBA_DIS_S */
> +
> +#define MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_CTRL		0x50000002
> +#define MITI_CTRL_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_USED		BIT(0)	/*
> +							 * Request VMM to deploy
> +							 * BHI_DIS_S mitigation
> +							 */
> +#define MITI_CTRL_RETPOLINE_S_USED		BIT(1)	/*
> +							 * Request VMM to deploy
> +							 * RRSBA_DIS_S mitigation
> +							 */
> +
>  /* AMD-V MSRs */
>  
>  #define MSR_VM_CR                       0xc0010114
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 3e3230cccaa7..a9e869f568ee 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -1379,6 +1379,28 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
>  	dump_stack();
>  }
>  
> +/* Speculation control using virtualized MSRs */
> +static void __init spec_ctrl_setup_virtualized_msr(void)
> +{
> +	u64 msr_virt_enum, msr_mitigation_enum, msr_mitigation_ctrl;
> +
> +	if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_VIRTUAL_ENUM))
> +		return;
> +
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_VIRTUAL_ENUMERATION, msr_virt_enum);
> +	if (!(msr_virt_enum & VIRT_ENUM_MITIGATION_CTRL_SUPPORT))
> +		return;
> +
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_ENUM, msr_mitigation_enum);
> +	/* When retpoline is being used, request relevant hardware controls */
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
> +	    msr_mitigation_enum & MITI_ENUM_RETPOLINE_S_SUPPORT) {
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_CTRL, msr_mitigation_ctrl);
> +		msr_mitigation_ctrl |= MITI_CTRL_RETPOLINE_S_USED;
> +		wrmsrl(MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_CTRL, msr_mitigation_ctrl);
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>  {
>  	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
> @@ -1485,6 +1507,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>  	    mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
>  		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
>  
> +	spec_ctrl_setup_virtualized_msr();

I think this also needs to be called during secondary CPU
initialization.