linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out vm_map

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <Y52wsONH+u/h0nuj@lucifer>
Date:   Sat, 17 Dec 2022 12:06:08 +0000
From:   Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@...il.com>
To:     Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, urezki@...il.com,
        stephen.s.brennan@...cle.com, willy@...radead.org,
        akpm@...ux-foundation.org, hch@...radead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out
 vm_map_ram areas

On Sat, Dec 17, 2022 at 09:54:31AM +0800, Baoquan He wrote:
> Currently, vread can read out vmalloc areas which is associated with
> a vm_struct. While this doesn't work for areas created by vm_map_ram()
> interface because it doesn't have an associated vm_struct. Then in vread(),
> these areas will be skipped.
>
> Here, add a new function vb_vread() to read out areas managed by
> vmap_block specifically. Then recognize vm_map_ram areas via vmap->flags
> and handle them respectively.
>
> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
> ---
>  mm/vmalloc.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
> index 190f29bbaaa7..6612914459cf 100644
> --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> @@ -3515,6 +3515,51 @@ static int aligned_vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
>  	return copied;
>  }
>
> +static void vb_vread(char *buf, char *addr, int count)
> +{
> +	char *start;
> +	struct vmap_block *vb;
> +	unsigned long offset;
> +	unsigned int rs, re, n;
> +
> +	vb = xa_load(&vmap_blocks, addr_to_vb_idx((unsigned long)addr));
> +
> +	spin_lock(&vb->lock);
> +	if (bitmap_empty(vb->used_map, VMAP_BBMAP_BITS)) {
> +		spin_unlock(&vb->lock);
> +		memset(buf, 0, count);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +	for_each_set_bitrange(rs, re, vb->used_map, VMAP_BBMAP_BITS) {
> +		if (!count)
> +			break;
> +		start = vmap_block_vaddr(vb->va->va_start, rs);
> +		if (addr < start) {
> +			if (count == 0)
> +				break;
> +			*buf = '\0';
> +			buf++;
> +			addr++;
> +			count--;
> +		}

I may be missing something here, but is this not essentially 'if the address is
below a used region, write a single null byte into the buffer and continue,
assuming we are now in a used area?'

This doesn't seem right, but I am happy to be corrected (perhaps we only expect
to be a single byte below a start region?)

> +		/*it could start reading from the middle of used region*/
> +		offset = offset_in_page(addr);
> +		n = (re - rs + 1) << PAGE_SHIFT - offset;

The kernel bot has already picked up on this paren issue :)

> +		if (n > count)
> +			n = count;
> +		aligned_vread(buf, start+offset, n);
> +
> +		buf += n;
> +		addr += n;
> +		count -= n;
> +	}
> +	spin_unlock(&vb->lock);
> +
> +	/* zero-fill the left dirty or free regions */
> +	if (count)
> +		memset(buf, 0, count);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * vread() - read vmalloc area in a safe way.
>   * @buf:     buffer for reading data
> @@ -3545,7 +3590,7 @@ long vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
>  	struct vm_struct *vm;
>  	char *vaddr, *buf_start = buf;
>  	unsigned long buflen = count;
> -	unsigned long n;
> +	unsigned long n, size, flags;
>
>  	addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
>
> @@ -3566,12 +3611,16 @@ long vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
>  		if (!count)
>  			break;
>
> -		if (!va->vm)
> +		vm = va->vm;
> +		flags = va->flags & VMAP_FLAGS_MASK;
> +
> +		if (!vm && !flags)
>  			continue;
>

This seems very delicate now as going forward, vm _could_ be NULL. In fact, a
later patch in the series then goes on to use vm and assume it is not null (will
comment).

I feel we should be very explicit after here asserting that vm != NULL.

> -		vm = va->vm;
> -		vaddr = (char *) vm->addr;
> -		if (addr >= vaddr + get_vm_area_size(vm))
> +		vaddr = (char *) va->va_start;
> +		size = flags ? va_size(va) : get_vm_area_size(vm);

For example here, I feel that this ternary should be reversed and based on
whether vm is null, unles we expect vm to ever be non-null _and_ flags to be
set?

> +
> +		if (addr >= vaddr + size)
>  			continue;
>  		while (addr < vaddr) {
>  			if (count == 0)
> @@ -3581,10 +3630,13 @@ long vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
>  			addr++;
>  			count--;
>  		}
> -		n = vaddr + get_vm_area_size(vm) - addr;
> +		n = vaddr + size - addr;
>  		if (n > count)
>  			n = count;
> -		if (!(vm->flags & VM_IOREMAP))
> +
> +		if ((flags & (VMAP_RAM|VMAP_BLOCK)) == (VMAP_RAM|VMAP_BLOCK))
> +			vb_vread(buf, addr, n);
> +		else if ((flags & VMAP_RAM) || !(vm->flags & VM_IOREMAP))
>  			aligned_vread(buf, addr, n);
>  		else /* IOREMAP area is treated as memory hole */
>  			memset(buf, 0, n);
> --
> 2.34.1
>