linux-kernel - [PATCH -next] evm: Use __vfs_setxattr() to update security.evm

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Message-ID: <20221228030248.94285-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Date:   Wed, 28 Dec 2022 11:02:48 +0800
From:   Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
To:     <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        <paul@...l-moore.com>, <jmorris@...ei.org>, <serge@...lyn.com>
CC:     <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH -next] evm: Use __vfs_setxattr() to update security.evm

Currently it uses __vfs_setxattr_noperm() to update "security.evm",
however there are two lsm hooks(inode_post_setxattr and inode_setsecurity)
being called inside this function, which don't make any sense for xattr
"security.evm", because the handlers of these two hooks, such as selinux
and smack, only care about their own xattr.

On the other hand, there is a literally rather than actually cyclical
callchain as follows:
security_inode_post_setxattr
  ->evm_inode_post_setxattr
    ->evm_update_evmxattr
      ->__vfs_setxattr_noperm
        ->security_inode_post_setxattr

So use __vfs_setxattr() to update "security.evm".

Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c   | 7 +++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index fa5ff13fa8c9..d8275dfa49ef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -376,10 +376,9 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 			   xattr_value_len, &data);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry,
-					   XATTR_NAME_EVM,
-					   &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
-					   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
+		rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, d_inode(dentry),
+				    XATTR_NAME_EVM, &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
+				    SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
 	} else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
 		rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index ee6f7e237f2e..d2de9dc6c345 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG;
 		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo;
 	}
-	rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
-				   &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
-				   (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
-				   iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
+	rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, d_inode(dentry),
+			    XATTR_NAME_IMA, &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
+			    (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
+			    iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1