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Message-ID: <cfe514f9-bf6c-292d-a481-48614aeb9dd6@citrix.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 22:06:56 +0000
From: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
xen-devel <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>,
Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@...rix.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Joan Bruguera <joanbrugueram@...il.com>
Subject: Re: Wake-up from suspend to RAM broken under `retbleed=stuff`
On 11/01/2023 11:45 am, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 11.01.2023 12:39, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> The bigger issue with stuff accounting is that nothing AFAICT accounts
>> for the fact that any hypercall potentially empties the RSB in otherwise
>> synchronous program flow.
> But that's not just at hypercall boundaries, but effectively anywhere
> (i.e. whenever the hypervisor decides to de-schedule the vCPU)?
Correct, but it's only the RET instructions that reliably underflow the
RSB which can be usefully attacked.
The %rip at which Xen decides to de-schedule a vCPU are random from the
point of view of an attacker.
~Andrew
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