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Message-ID: <55e5f02f-4c1f-e6b0-59ba-07abc4d3408f@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 11:48:56 +1100
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
To: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
ardb@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
vkuznets@...hat.com, wanpengli@...cent.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com,
pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, alpergun@...gle.com,
dgilbert@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org, harald@...fian.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for
SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
On 10/1/23 19:33, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>
> On 1/9/2023 8:28 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10/1/23 10:41, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>>> On 1/8/2023 9:33 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>> On 15/12/22 06:40, Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>>>
>>>>> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
>>>>> Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to
>>>>> make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
>>>>> SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
>>>>>
>>>>> The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
>>>>> difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed
>>>>> through
>>>>> the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
>>>>> provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get
>>>>> both the report and certificate data at once.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 185
>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +
>>>>> 2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> index 5f2b2092cdae..18efa70553c2 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>>> struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>>> if (ret)
>>>>> goto e_free;
>>>>> + mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>> ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error, false);
>>>>> } else {
>>>>> ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
>>>>> @@ -2051,23 +2052,34 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm
>>>>> *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
>>>>> */
>>>>> static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct
>>>>> kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>>> {
>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>> struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {};
>>>>> - void *context;
>>>>> + void *context, *certs_data;
>>>>> int rc;
>>>>> + /* Allocate memory used for the certs data in SNP guest
>>>>> request */
>>>>> + certs_data = kzalloc(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>>> + if (!certs_data)
>>>>> + return NULL;
>>>>> +
>>>>> /* Allocate memory for context page */
>>>>> context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>>> if (!context)
>>>>> - return NULL;
>>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>>> data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
>>>>> rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE,
>>>>> &data, &argp->error);
>>>>> - if (rc) {
>>>>> - snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>>> - return NULL;
>>>>> - }
>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + sev->snp_certs_data = certs_data;
>>>>> return context;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +e_free:
>>>>> + snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>>> + kfree(certs_data);
>>>>> + return NULL;
>>>>> }
>>>>> static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
>>>>> @@ -2653,6 +2665,8 @@ static int snp_decommission_context(struct
>>>>> kvm *kvm)
>>>>> snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
>>>>> sev->snp_context = NULL;
>>>>> + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
>>>>> +
>>>>> return 0;
>>>>> }
>>>>> @@ -3174,6 +3188,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct
>>>>> vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *exit_code)
>>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
>>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES:
>>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
>>>>> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>>> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>>> break;
>>>>> default:
>>>>> reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
>>>>> @@ -3396,6 +3412,149 @@ static int snp_complete_psc(struct kvm_vcpu
>>>>> *vcpu)
>>>>> return 1;
>>>>> }
>>>>> +static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
>>>>> + gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>> + kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn;
>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa,
>>>>> PAGE_SIZE))
>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa));
>>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn))
>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa));
>>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn))
>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true))
>>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
>>>>> + data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>>> + data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct
>>>>> sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, unsigned long *rc)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn);
>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t
>>>>> req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0};
>>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>> + unsigned long rc;
>>>>> + int err;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>> + goto unlock;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data, &err);
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This one goes via sev_issue_cmd_external_user() and uses sev-fd...
>>>>
>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>> + /* use the firmware error code */
>>>>> + rc = err;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +unlock:
>>>>> + mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +e_fail:
>>>>> + svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>>> gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
>>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>> + unsigned long data_npages;
>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>> + unsigned long rc, err;
>>>>> + u64 data_gpa;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
>>>>> + data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
>>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>> + goto unlock;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned
>>>>> long)sev->snp_certs_data,
>>>>> + &data_npages, &err);
>>>>
>>>> but this one does not and jump straight to
>>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c ignoring sev->fd. Why different? Can
>>>> these two be unified? sev_issue_cmd_external_user() only checks if
>>>> fd is /dev/sev which is hardly useful.
>>>>
>>>> "[PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended
>>>> attestation report" added this one.
>>>
>>> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST additionally returns a certificate blob and
>>> that's why it goes through the CCP driver interface
>>> snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used to get both the report and
>>> certificate data/blob at the same time.
>>
>> True. I thought though that this calls for extending sev_issue_cmd()
>> to take care of these extra parameters rather than just skipping the
>> sev->fd.
>>
>>
>>> All the FW API calls on the KVM side go through sev_issue_cmd() and
>>> sev_issue_cmd_external_user() interfaces and that i believe uses
>>> sev->fd more of as a sanity check.
>>
>> Does not look like it:
>>
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c?h=v6.2-rc3#n1290
>>
>> ===
>> int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
>> void *data, int *error)
>> {
>> if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
>> return -EBADF;
>>
>> return sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error);
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user);
>> ===
>>
>> The only "more" is that it requires sev->fd to be a valid open fd,
>> what is the value in that? I may easily miss the bigger picture here.
>> Thanks,
>>
>>
>
> Have a look at following functions in drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:
> sev_dev_init() and sev_misc_init().
>
> static int sev_misc_init(struct sev_device *sev)
> {
> struct device *dev = sev->dev;
> int ret;
>
> /*
> * SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but
> * the SEV FW commands must be issued on the master. During
> * probe, we do not know the master hence we create /dev/sev on
> * the first device probe.
> * sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to issue
> * the command to the firmware.
> */
It is still a single /dev/sev node and the userspace cannot get it
wrong, it does not have to choose between (for instance) /dev/sev0 and
/dev/sev1 on a 2 SOC system.
> ...
> ...
>
> Hence, sev_issue_cmd_external_user() needs to ensure that the correct
> device (master device) is being operated upon and that's why there is
> the check for file operations matching sev_fops as below :
>
> int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
> void *data, int *error)
> {
> if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
> return -EBADF;
> ..
> ..
>
> Essentially, sev->fd is the misc. device created for the master PSP
> device on which the SEV/SNP firmware commands are issued, hence,
> sev_issue_cmd() uses sev->fd.
There is always just one fd which always uses psp_master, nothing from
that fd is used.
More to the point, if sev->fd is still important, why is it ok to skip
it for snp_handle_ext_guest_request()? Thanks,
--
Alexey
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