linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v5 1/2] selftests/x86: sysret

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Message-ID: <13EFEDBA-3BC2-4654-BFDD-53E79178107B@zytor.com>
Date:   Wed, 25 Jan 2023 09:25:21 -0800
From:   "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To:     Ammar Faizi <ammarfaizi2@...weeb.org>
CC:     Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        x86 Mailing List <x86@...nel.org>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Linux Kselftest Mailing List 
        <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 1/2] selftests/x86: sysret_rip: Handle syscall in a FRED system

On January 25, 2023 3:37:23 AM PST, Ammar Faizi <ammarfaizi2@...weeb.org> wrote:
>On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 02:17:41AM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>> I guess it would depend on what they "normally" are. My #1 impulse would be to leave them both unchanged.
>
>Ah okay... I think I understand now. My confusion came from a comment
>in that code.
>
>The current SIGUSR1 handler has a comment:
>
>    /* Set IP and CX to match so that SYSRET can happen. */
>    ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] = rip;
>    ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RCX] = rip;
>
>So I thought if we leave them both unchanged, then SYSRET can happen
>too, because IP and CX match. My initial confusion about that was:
>
>    Where do we actually exercise IRET if the SIGUSR2 handler
>    exercises SYSRET then?
>
>I realized my assumption was wrong. The current SIGUSR1 handler
>actually forces the kernel to use IRET, not SYSRET. Because the %rip
>is set to a non-canonical address. So that's the place where it
>exercises IRET.
>
>IOW, my understanding now:
>
>The current SIGUSR1 handler exercises the SYSRET-appropriate condition
>detector in the kernel. It doesn't actually go to the SYSRET path
>despite the comment saying "SYSRET can happen". That detector must take
>us to the IRET path or we will #GP in kernel space on Intel CPUs.
>
>In short, the SIGUSR1 handler asserts that "SYSRET must *not* happen".
>
>The expected SIGUSR2 handler addition exercises the SYSRET path by
>leaving REG_IP and REG_CX unchanged.
>
>Am I correct?
>

That's the idea.