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Date:   Tue, 31 Jan 2023 20:22:49 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>,
        Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@...cle.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@....com>,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@....com>,
        Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel v3 2/3] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES

Hey Sean,

On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 02:10:46PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> Prior to SEV-ES, KVM stored/loaded host debug registers upon switching
> to/from a VM. Changing those registers inside a running SEV VM
> triggered #VC exit to KVM.
> 
> SEV-ES added the encrypted state (ES) which uses an encrypted guest page
> for the VM state (VMSA). The hardware saves/restores certain registers on
> VMRUN/VMEXIT according to a swap type (A, B, C), see
> "Table B-3. Swap Types" in the AMD Architecture Programmer’s Manual
> volume 2.
> 
> AMD Milan (Fam 19h) introduces support for the debug registers swapping.
> DR6 and DR7 are always swapped. DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK are swapped
> a type B when SEV_FEATURES[5] ("DebugSwap") is set.
> 
> Enable DebugSwap in VMSA. But only do so if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0]
> ("NoNestedDataBp", "Processor ignores nested data breakpoints") is
> supported by the SOC as otherwise a malicious SEV-ES guest can set up
> data breakpoints on the #VC IDT entry/stack and cause an infinite loop.
> 
> Eliminate DR7 and #DB intercepts as:
> - they are not needed when DebugSwap is supported;
> - #VC for these intercepts is most likely not supported anyway and
> kills the VM.
> Keep DR7 intercepted unless DebugSwap enabled to prevent the infinite #DB
> loop DoS.

...

ok to take this through the tip tree?

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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