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Message-Id: <1676018856-26520-6-git-send-email-tangyouling@loongson.cn>
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 16:47:36 +0800
From: Youling Tang <tangyouling@...ngson.cn>
To: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>,
Xi Ruoyao <xry111@...111.site>,
Jinyang He <hejinyang@...ngson.cn>
Cc: Xuerui Wang <kernel@...0n.name>, loongarch@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/5] LoongArch: Add support for kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR)
This patch adds support for relocating the kernel to a random address.
Entropy is derived from the banner, which will change every build and
random_get_entropy() which should provide additional runtime entropy.
The kernel is relocated by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET bytes from
its link address. Because relocation happens so early in the kernel boot,
the amount of physical memory has not yet been determined. This means
the only way to limit relocation within the available memory is via
Kconfig. Limit the maximum value of RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET to
256M(0x10000000) because our memory layout has many holes.
Signed-off-by: Youling Tang <tangyouling@...ngson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@...111.site> # Fix compiler warnings
---
arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 23 +++++
arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S | 14 ++-
arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
index 089a4695b1b3..f0a070bd7254 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
@@ -489,6 +489,29 @@ config RELOCATABLE
kernel binary at runtime to a different virtual address than the
address it was linked at.
+config RANDOMIZE_BASE
+ bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR)"
+ depends on RELOCATABLE
+ help
+ Randomizes the physical and virtual address at which the
+ kernel image is loaded, as a security feature that
+ deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
+ of kernel internals.
+
+ The kernel will be offset by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
+ hex "Maximum KASLR offset" if EXPERT
+ depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE
+ range 0x0 0x10000000 if 64BIT
+ default "0x01000000"
+ help
+ When KASLR is active, this provides the maximum offset that will
+ be applied to the kernel image.
+
+
config SECCOMP
bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
depends on PROC_FS
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S b/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S
index 499edc80d8ab..b12f459ad73a 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S
@@ -87,10 +87,22 @@ SYM_CODE_START(kernel_entry) # kernel entry point
set_saved_sp sp, t0, t1
#ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+ bl do_kaslr
+
+ /* Repoint the sp into the new kernel image */
+ PTR_LI sp, (_THREAD_SIZE - PT_SIZE)
+ PTR_ADD sp, sp, tp
+ set_saved_sp sp, t0, t1
+
+ /* do_kaslr returns the new kernel image entry point */
+ jr a0
+ ASM_BUG()
+#else
/* Apply the relocations */
bl relocate_kernel
#endif
-
+#endif
bl start_kernel
ASM_BUG()
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c
index 91ce92433bab..5266f23a3006 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c
@@ -9,19 +9,21 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
+#include <asm/bootinfo.h>
+#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#define RELOCATED(x) ((void *)((long)x + reloc_offset))
+#define RELOCATED_KASLR(x) ((void *)((long)x + offset))
extern long __rela_dyn_start;
extern long __rela_dyn_end;
static unsigned long reloc_offset;
-void __init relocate_kernel(void)
+static inline __init void relocate_relative(void)
{
- reloc_offset = (unsigned long)_text - VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS;
-
if (reloc_offset) {
Elf64_Rela *rela, *rela_end;
rela = (Elf64_Rela *)&__rela_dyn_start;
@@ -43,6 +45,141 @@ void __init relocate_kernel(void)
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+static inline __init unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash,
+ const void *area, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
+ /* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
+ hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
+ hash ^= ptr[i];
+ }
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
+static inline __init unsigned long get_random_boot(void)
+{
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ unsigned long hash = 0;
+
+ /* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
+ hash = rotate_xor(hash, linux_banner, strlen(linux_banner));
+
+ /* Add in any runtime entropy we can get */
+ hash = rotate_xor(hash, &entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
+static inline __init bool kaslr_disabled(void)
+{
+ char *str;
+
+ str = strstr(boot_command_line, "nokaslr");
+ if (str == boot_command_line || (str > boot_command_line && *(str - 1) == ' '))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Choose a new address for the kernel */
+static inline void __init *determine_relocation_address(void)
+{
+ unsigned long kernel_length;
+ void *dest = _text;
+ unsigned long offset;
+
+ if (kaslr_disabled())
+ return dest;
+
+ kernel_length = (long)_end - (long)_text;
+
+ offset = get_random_boot() << 16;
+ offset &= (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET - 1);
+ if (offset < kernel_length)
+ offset += ALIGN(kernel_length, 0xffff);
+
+ return RELOCATED_KASLR(dest);
+}
+
+static inline int __init relocation_addr_valid(void *loc_new)
+{
+ if ((unsigned long)loc_new & 0x00000ffff) {
+ /* Inappropriately aligned new location */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((unsigned long)loc_new < (unsigned long)_end) {
+ /* New location overlaps original kernel */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static inline void __init update_reloc_offset(unsigned long *addr, long offset)
+{
+ unsigned long *new_addr = (unsigned long *)RELOCATED_KASLR(addr);
+
+ *new_addr = (unsigned long)offset;
+}
+
+void *__init do_kaslr(void)
+{
+ void *loc_new;
+ unsigned long kernel_length;
+ long offset = 0;
+ /* Default to original kernel entry point */
+ void *kernel_entry = start_kernel;
+ char *cmdline = early_ioremap(fw_arg1, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+
+ /* Boot command line was passed in fw_arg1 */
+ strscpy(boot_command_line, cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+
+ kernel_length = (long)(_end) - (long)(_text);
+
+ loc_new = determine_relocation_address();
+
+ /* Sanity check relocation address */
+ if (relocation_addr_valid(loc_new))
+ offset = (unsigned long)loc_new - (unsigned long)(_text);
+
+ if (offset) {
+ /* Copy the kernel to it's new location */
+ memcpy(loc_new, _text, kernel_length);
+
+ /* Sync the caches ready for execution of new kernel */
+ __asm__ __volatile__ (
+ "ibar 0 \t\n"
+ "dbar 0 \t\n");
+
+ reloc_offset = (unsigned long)_text - VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS;
+ reloc_offset += offset;
+
+ relocate_relative();
+
+ /* The current thread is now within the relocated image */
+ __current_thread_info = RELOCATED_KASLR(__current_thread_info);
+
+ /* Return the new kernel's entry point */
+ kernel_entry = RELOCATED_KASLR(start_kernel);
+
+ update_reloc_offset(&reloc_offset, offset);
+ }
+
+ return kernel_entry;
+}
+#endif
+
+void __init relocate_kernel(void)
+{
+ reloc_offset = (unsigned long)_text - VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS;
+
+ relocate_relative();
+}
+
/*
* Show relocation information on panic.
*/
--
2.37.3
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