Message-ID: <22e96dfd-21af-681c-22d2-12bcc082f63e@amd.com>
Date:   Mon, 13 Feb 2023 15:43:27 -0600
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To:     Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <Borislav.Petkov@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@...cle.com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Michael Sterritt <sterritt@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 1/3] virt/coco/sev-guest: Add throttling awareness

On 2/13/23 11:25, Dionna Glaze wrote:
> The host is permitted and encouraged to throttle guest requests to the
> AMD-SP since it is a shared resource across all VMs. Without
> throttling-awareness, the host returning an error will immediately lock
> out access to the VMPCK, which makes the VM less useful as it can't
> attest itself. Since throttling is expected for a host to protect itself
> from an uncooperative guest, a cooperative host can return a VMM error
> code that the request was throttled.
> 
> The driver interprets the upper 32 bits of exitinfo2 as a VMM error code.
> For safety, since the encryption algorithm in GHCBv2 is AES_GCM, control
> must remain in the kernel to complete the request with the current
> sequence number. Returning without finishing the request allows the
> guest to make another request but with different message contents. This
> is IV reuse, and breaks cryptographic protections.
> 
> A quick fix is to retry for a while and then disable the VMPCK and
> return to user space.
> 
> A guest request may not make it to the AMD-SP before the host returns to
> the guest, so the err local variable in handle_guest_request must be
> initialized the same way fw_err is. snp_issue_guest_request similarly
> should set fw_err whether or not the value is non-zero, in order to
> appropriately clear the error value when zero.
> 
> The IV reuse fix for invalid certs_len needs modification to work with
> throttling, since a single retry with a modified exit_code may be
> throttled without retry and result in a locked-out VMPCK. Instead,
> change the exit_code as before and jump to the same retry label, and
> deal with the error code fixup by checking if the exit_code had to be
> changed.
> 
> Another issue that must be fixed is how crypto results are written to
> shared memory. The solution is to double-buffer messages.

This should really be a new, separate patch.

> 
> The encryption algorithms read and write directly to shared unencrypted
> memory, which may leak information as well as permit the host to tamper
> with the message integrity. Instead copy whole messages in or out as
> needed before doing any computation on them.
> 
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
> Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <Borislav.Petkov@....com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@...cle.com>
> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
> Cc: Michael Sterritt <sterritt@...gle.com>
> 
> Fixes: d5af44dde546 ("x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request
> NAEs")

This shouldn't line wrap.

> 
> Signed-off-by: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h       |  3 +-
>   arch/x86/kernel/sev.c                   |  3 +-
>   drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++----
>   3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> index b8357d6ecd47..b63be696b776 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
> @@ -128,8 +128,9 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
>   	struct psc_entry entries[VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY];
>   } __packed;
>   
> -/* Guest message request error code */
> +/* Guest message request error codes */
>   #define SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN	BIT_ULL(32)
> +#define SNP_GUEST_REQ_ERR_BUSY		BIT_ULL(33)
>   
>   #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ		0x100
>   #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS	12
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 679026a640ef..a908ffc2dfba 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -2212,14 +2212,13 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned
>   	if (ret)
>   		goto e_put;
>   
> +	*fw_err = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
>   	if (ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2) {
>   		/* Number of expected pages are returned in RBX */
>   		if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST &&
>   		    ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2 == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
>   			input->data_npages = ghcb_get_rbx(ghcb);
>   
> -		*fw_err = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
> -
>   		ret = -EIO;
>   	}
>   
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> index 4ec4174e05a3..4945f2dd97a2 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>   #define DEVICE_NAME	"sev-guest"
>   #define AAD_LEN		48
>   #define MSG_HDR_VER	1
> +#define ACCEPTABLE_REQUEST_RETRY_DURATION (60*HZ)
>   
>   struct snp_guest_crypto {
>   	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
> @@ -43,7 +44,13 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {
>   
>   	void *certs_data;
>   	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
> +	/* request and response are in unencrypted memory */
>   	struct snp_guest_msg *request, *response;
> +	/*
> +	 * Avoid information leakage by double-buffering shared messages
> +	 * in fields that are in regular encrypted memory.
> +	 */
> +	struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response;
>   	struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
>   	struct snp_req_data input;
>   	u32 *os_area_msg_seqno;
> @@ -263,14 +270,17 @@ static int dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
>   static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, u32 sz)
>   {
>   	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
> -	struct snp_guest_msg *resp = snp_dev->response;
> -	struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request;
> +	struct snp_guest_msg *resp = &snp_dev->secret_response;
> +	struct snp_guest_msg *req = &snp_dev->secret_request;
>   	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *req_hdr = &req->hdr;
>   	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_hdr = &resp->hdr;
>   
>   	dev_dbg(snp_dev->dev, "response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
>   		resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, resp_hdr->msg_sz);
>   
> +	/* Copy response from shared memory to encrypted memory. */
> +	memcpy(resp, snp_dev->response, sizeof(*resp));
> +
>   	/* Verify that the sequence counter is incremented by 1 */
>   	if (unlikely(resp_hdr->msg_seqno != (req_hdr->msg_seqno + 1)))
>   		return -EBADMSG;
> @@ -294,7 +304,7 @@ static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload,
>   static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 type,
>   			void *payload, size_t sz)
>   {
> -	struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request;
> +	struct snp_guest_msg *req = &snp_dev->secret_request;
>   	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &req->hdr;
>   
>   	memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
> @@ -322,22 +332,34 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
>   				u8 type, void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf,
>   				u32 resp_sz, __u64 *fw_err)
>   {
> -	unsigned long err;
> +	unsigned long err = 0xff;
> +	unsigned long start_time = jiffies;
> +	u64 orig_exit_code = exit_code;
>   	u64 seqno;
>   	int rc;
> +	unsigned int certs_npages = 0;
>   
>   	/* Get message sequence and verify that its a non-zero */
>   	seqno = snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
>   	if (!seqno)
>   		return -EIO;
>   
> +	/* Clear shared memory's response for the host to populate. */
>   	memset(snp_dev->response, 0, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
>   
> -	/* Encrypt the userspace provided payload */
> +	/* Encrypt the userspace provided payload in snp_dev->secret_request. */
>   	rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, msg_ver, type, req_buf, req_sz);
>   	if (rc)
>   		return rc;
>   
> +	/*
> +	 * Write the fully encrypted request to the shared unencrypted
> +	 * request page.
> +	 */
> +	memcpy(snp_dev->request, &snp_dev->secret_request,
> +	       sizeof(snp_dev->secret_request));
> +
> +retry:
>   	/*
>   	 * Call firmware to process the request. In this function the encrypted
>   	 * message enters shared memory with the host. So after this call the
> @@ -346,6 +368,20 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
>   	 */
>   	rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
>   
> +	/*
> +	 * The host may return SNP_GUEST_REQ_ERR_EBUSY if the request has been
> +	 * throttled. Retry in the driver to avoid returning and reusing the
> +	 * message sequence number on a different message.
> +	 */
> +	if (err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_ERR_BUSY) {
> +		if (jiffies - start_time > ACCEPTABLE_REQUEST_RETRY_DURATION) {
> +			rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
> +			goto disable_vmpck;
> +		}
> +		cond_resched();
> +		goto retry;

It looks like you will ensure throttling by continually calling the 
hypervisor for 60 seconds, shouldn't there be a delay here?

> +	}
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * If the extended guest request fails due to having too small of a
>   	 * certificate data buffer, retry the same guest request without the
> @@ -354,7 +390,7 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
>   	 */
>   	if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST &&
>   	    err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN) {
> -		const unsigned int certs_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages;
> +		certs_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages;
>   
>   		exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
>   
> @@ -366,8 +402,12 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
>   		 * of the VMPCK and the error code being propagated back to the
>   		 * user as an ioctl() return code.
>   		 */
> -		rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
> +		cond_resched();
> +		goto retry;
>   
> +	}

Nit, add a blank line here.

Thanks,
Tom

> +	if (orig_exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST &&
> +	    exit_code != orig_exit_code) {
>   		/*
>   		 * Override the error to inform callers the given extended
>   		 * request buffer size was too small and give the caller the

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