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Message-ID: <807cca5b-06b9-da85-738b-d88fc10298cb@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 10:17:12 +0100
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
lists@...dbynature.de, mikelley@...rosoft.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/8] x86/mtrr: support setting MTRR state for software
defined MTRRs
On 14.02.23 10:10, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 14, 2023 at 10:02:51AM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> I just don't like the idea of trying to catch all possible misuses in
>> lower levels, at the same time introducing the need to modify those
>> tests in case a new valid use case is popping up.
>
> So what would you do: generally allow this so that potentially other
> guest configurations misuse it?
I guess this largely depends on the functionality. I don't see why anyone
would try to use MTRR overwrite functionality without really needing it.
But maybe I'm wrong here and I'm under-estimating the "creativity" of
kernel hackers.
> And when we decide to change it, all those users will come running and
> complaining that we broke it?
>
> And then we're stuck with a nasty workaround in the tree because we have
> to support them too?
>
> See, all we do here is because of such misguided (or maybe didn't know
> better) decisions which have happened a long time ago.
I can see your point.
Maybe I haven't seen enough crazy hacks yet. :-)
No need to further discuss this topic from my side, as I have voiced my
opinion and you did so, too. I will add the tests you are asking for.
Juergen
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