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Message-ID: <4f0d03de-4372-2472-ef59-e80bb3aa7703@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 19:39:07 +0800
From: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@...il.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/21] KVM: x86: Disallow writes to immutable feature
MSRs after KVM_RUN
On 10/2/2023 8:31 am, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Disallow writes to feature MSRs after KVM_RUN to prevent userspace from
> changing the vCPU model after running the vCPU. Similar to guest CPUID,
> KVM uses feature MSRs to configure intercepts, determine what operations
> are/aren't allowed, etc. Changing the capabilities while the vCPU is
> active will at best yield unpredictable guest behavior, and at worst
> could be dangerous to KVM.
>
> Allow writing the current value, e.g. so that userspace can blindly set
> all MSRs when emulating RESET, and unconditionally allow writes to
> MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV so that userspace can emulate patch loads.
>
> Special case the VMX MSRs to keep the generic list small, i.e. so that
> KVM can do a linear walk of the generic list without incurring meaningful
> overhead.
>
> Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 7b73a0b45041..186cb6a81643 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1554,6 +1554,25 @@ static u32 msr_based_features[ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx) +
> (KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR - KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR + 1)];
> static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
>
> +/*
> + * All feature MSRs except uCode revID, which tracks the currently loaded uCode
> + * patch, are immutable once the vCPU model is defined.
> + */
> +static bool kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(u32 msr)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + if (msr >= KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR && msr <= KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR)
> + return true;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx); i++) {
> + if (msr == msr_based_features_all_except_vmx[i])
> + return msr != MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Some IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits have dependencies on MSRs that KVM
> * does not yet virtualize. These include:
> @@ -2168,6 +2187,23 @@ static int do_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
>
> static int do_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
> {
> + u64 val;
> +
> + /*
> + * Disallow writes to immutable feature MSRs after KVM_RUN. KVM does
> + * not support modifying the guest vCPU model on the fly, e.g. changing
> + * the nVMX capabilities while L2 is running is nonsensical. Ignore
> + * writes of the same value, e.g. to allow userspace to blindly stuff
> + * all MSRs when emulating RESET.
> + */
> + if (vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1 &&
Three concerns on my mind (to help you think more if any):
- why not using kvm->created_vcpus;
- how about different vcpu models of the same guest have different feature_msr
values;
(although they are not altered after the first run, cases (selftests) may be
needed to
show that it is dangerous for KVM);
- the relative time to set "vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu = vcpu->cpu" is still
too late,
since part of the guest code (an attack window) has already been executed on first
run of kvm_x86_vcpu_run() which may run for a long time;
> + kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(index)) {
> + if (do_get_msr(vcpu, index, &val) || *data != val)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> return kvm_set_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, *data, true);
> }
>
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