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Message-Id: <20230215124747.6f8df3c4675517eacf1e9a39@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 12:47:47 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in
__sys_setres[ug]id()
On Wed, 15 Feb 2023 14:18:07 +0100 Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
> 1. First determine if CAP_SET[UG]ID is required and only then call
> ns_capable_setid(), to avoid bogus LSM (SELinux) denials.
Can we please have more details on the selinux failures? Under what
circumstances? What is the end-user impact?
Because a fix for "bogus LSM (SELinux) denials" sounds like something
which should be backported into earlier kernels, but there simply isn't
sufficient information here for others to decide on this.
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