linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in __sys

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Date:   Thu, 16 Feb 2023 10:07:53 -0600
From:   "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in
 __sys_setres[ug]id()

Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> writes:

> On Wed, 15 Feb 2023 14:18:07 +0100 Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
>
>> 1. First determine if CAP_SET[UG]ID is required and only then call
>>    ns_capable_setid(), to avoid bogus LSM (SELinux) denials.
>
> Can we please have more details on the selinux failures?  Under what
> circumstances?  What is the end-user impact?

It is puzzling the structure with having the capability check first
dates to 2.1.104 (when a hand coded test for root was replaced
with capable(CAP_SETID).  Which means the basic structure and logic
of the code is even older than that.

Eric