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Message-ID: <CAFqZXNsP8zrQ=trMqLE09T5P-poeDPAVLj_YkTc1NpEDn4c_Sw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2023 17:14:05 +0100
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in __sys_setres[ug]id()
On Wed, Feb 15, 2023 at 9:47 PM Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 15 Feb 2023 14:18:07 +0100 Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> > 1. First determine if CAP_SET[UG]ID is required and only then call
> > ns_capable_setid(), to avoid bogus LSM (SELinux) denials.
>
> Can we please have more details on the selinux failures? Under what
> circumstances? What is the end-user impact?
>
> Because a fix for "bogus LSM (SELinux) denials" sounds like something
> which should be backported into earlier kernels, but there simply isn't
> sufficient information here for others to decide on this.
Fair point. I will send a v2 with a more detailed explanation.
--
Ondrej Mosnacek
Senior Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.
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