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Message-ID: <ZAz8QlynTSMD7kuE@kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2023 00:10:10 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Cc: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com, dwmw2@...radead.org,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, davem@...emloft.net,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, pvorel@...e.cz, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
konrad.wilk@...cle.com, erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
coxu@...hat.com, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/6] KEYS: CA link restriction
On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> based on the key to be added being a CA.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 15 ++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> + *
> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> + */
> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> + const struct key_type *type,
> + const union key_payload *payload,
> + struct key *trust_keyring)
> +{
> + const struct public_key *pkey;
> +
> + if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> + if (!pkey)
> + return -ENOPKG;
> + if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> + return -ENOKEY;
nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
empty lines.
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
> const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
> {
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 03c3fb990d59..653992a6e941 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,21 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *trust_keyring,
> const union key_payload *payload,
> struct key *trusted);
>
> +#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE)
> +extern int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> + const struct key_type *type,
> + const union key_payload *payload,
> + struct key *trust_keyring);
> +#else
> +static inline int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> + const struct key_type *type,
> + const union key_payload *payload,
> + struct key *trust_keyring)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> extern int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *,
> struct kernel_pkey_query *);
>
> --
> 2.27.0
>
BR, Jarkko
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