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Message-ID: <32ec16c9c3caa731c3de69371de6318da7f7ea91.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 10:26:47 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>, jarkko@...nel.org,
dhowells@...hat.com, dwmw2@...radead.org
Cc: herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, davem@...emloft.net,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, pvorel@...e.cz, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
konrad.wilk@...cle.com, erpalmer@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
coxu@...hat.com, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] integrity: machine keyring CA configuration
On Thu, 2023-03-02 at 11:46 -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Add machine keyring CA restriction options to control the type of
> keys that may be added to it. The motivation is separation of
> certificate signing from code signing keys. Subsquent work will
> limit certificates being loaded into the IMA keyring to code
> signing keys used for signature verification.
>
> When no restrictions are selected, all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) are added
> to the machine keyring. When CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING is
> selected, the CA bit must be true. Also the key usage must contain
> keyCertSign, any other usage field may be set as well.
>
> When CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX is selected, the CA bit must
> be true. Also the key usage must contain keyCertSign and the
> digitialSignature usage may not be set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Thanks, Eric.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
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