linux-kernel - Re: [syzbot] [xfs?] WARNING in xfs_bmap_extents_to

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Message-ID: <20230330163953.GB629182@mit.edu>
Date:   Thu, 30 Mar 2023 12:39:53 -0400
From:   "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
To:     Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@...gle.com>
Cc:     Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
        syzbot <syzbot+0c383e46e9b4827b01b1@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
        djwong@...nel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-xfs@...r.kernel.org,
        syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [xfs?] WARNING in xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree

On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 10:52:37AM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote:
> > Given this is a maliciously corrupted filesystem image, this sort of
> > warning is expected and there's probably nothing we can do to avoid
> > it short of a full filesystem verification pass during mount.
> > That's not a viable solution, so I think we should just ignore
> > syzbot when it generates this sort of warning....
> 
> If it's not a warning about a kernel bug, then WARN_ON should probably
> be replaced by some more suitable reporting mechanism. Kernel coding
> style document explicitly says:
> 
> "WARN*() must not be used for a condition that is expected to trigger
> easily, for example, by user space actions. pr_warn_once() is a
> possible alternative, if you need to notify the user of a problem."
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/process/coding-style.rst?id=1e760fa3596e8c7f08412712c168288b79670d78#n1223
>

Well, the question is wether a maliciously corrupted file system is a
condition which is "triggered easily".  Note that it requries root
privileges to be able to mount a malciously corrupted file system,
and given that root can do all sorts of thigns that can crash the
system (example: kexec a maliciously created "kernel image" or
creating a high-priority real-time thread which starves kernel
threads), this is actually a much closer call.

					- Ted