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Message-ID: <b43b203d-5759-0c33-8587-4e84025552d7@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 8 May 2023 16:42:04 +0530
From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@....com>
To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Jan Dabros <jsd@...ihalf.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@...ux.intel.com>,
op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Mythri PK <Mythri.Pandeshwarakrishna@....com>,
Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@....com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Sourabh Das <sourabh.das@....com>,
Nimesh Easow <nimesh.easow@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] tee: amdtee: Add return_origin to 'struct
tee_cmd_load_ta'
On 5/5/2023 1:00 PM, Jens Wiklander wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Tue, May 2, 2023 at 8:25 AM Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@....com> wrote:
>>
>> After TEE has completed processing of TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA, set proper
>> value in 'return_origin' argument passed by open_session() call. To do
>> so, add 'return_origin' field to the structure tee_cmd_load_ta. The
>> Trusted OS shall update return_origin as part of TEE processing.
>>
>> This change to 'struct tee_cmd_load_ta' interface requires a similar update
>> in AMD-TEE Trusted OS's TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA interface.
>
> This is an ABI change, but it's not clear if it's an incompatible ABI
> change or not. What happens if the AMD-TEE Trusted OS isn't updated?
>
If AMD-TEE Trusted OS isn't updated, load_cmd.return_origin value will be 0.
load_cmd.return_origin will have non-zero value only if AMD-TEE Trusted OS on
the platform has the necessary ABI change.
At present, without this patch, arg->ret_origin is 0 and even with this patch
it will be 0 unless AMD-TEE Trusted OS on the platform has the ABI update. So,
this is not an incompatible ABI change.
>>
>> This patch has been verified on Phoenix Birman setup. On older APUs,
>> return_origin value will be 0.
>
> Why, because MD-TEE Trusted OS will not be updated on the older APUs?
>
Yes, that's correct - older APUs will not have updated AMD-TEE Trusted OS.
>>
>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>
> Which stable kernels are you targeting? A Fixes tag might answer that.
>
Okay, I will add a Fixes tag and post v2 patch.
Thanks,
Rijo
> Thanks,
> Jens
>
>> Tested-by: Sourabh Das <sourabh.das@....com>
>> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@....com>
>> ---
>> drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h | 10 ++++++----
>> drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
>> 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h
>> index ff48c3e47375..e2014e21530a 100644
>> --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h
>> +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h
>> @@ -118,16 +118,18 @@ struct tee_cmd_unmap_shared_mem {
>>
>> /**
>> * struct tee_cmd_load_ta - load Trusted Application (TA) binary into TEE
>> - * @low_addr: [in] bits [31:0] of the physical address of the TA binary
>> - * @hi_addr: [in] bits [63:32] of the physical address of the TA binary
>> - * @size: [in] size of TA binary in bytes
>> - * @ta_handle: [out] return handle of the loaded TA
>> + * @low_addr: [in] bits [31:0] of the physical address of the TA binary
>> + * @hi_addr: [in] bits [63:32] of the physical address of the TA binary
>> + * @size: [in] size of TA binary in bytes
>> + * @ta_handle: [out] return handle of the loaded TA
>> + * @return_origin: [out] origin of return code after TEE processing
>> */
>> struct tee_cmd_load_ta {
>> u32 low_addr;
>> u32 hi_addr;
>> u32 size;
>> u32 ta_handle;
>> + u32 return_origin;
>> };
>>
>> /**
>> diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c
>> index e8cd9aaa3467..e9b63dcb3194 100644
>> --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c
>> +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c
>> @@ -423,19 +423,23 @@ int handle_load_ta(void *data, u32 size, struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg *arg)
>> if (ret) {
>> arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS;
>> arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION;
>> - } else if (arg->ret == TEEC_SUCCESS) {
>> - ret = get_ta_refcount(load_cmd.ta_handle);
>> - if (!ret) {
>> - arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS;
>> - arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
>> -
>> - /* Unload the TA on error */
>> - unload_cmd.ta_handle = load_cmd.ta_handle;
>> - psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA,
>> - (void *)&unload_cmd,
>> - sizeof(unload_cmd), &ret);
>> - } else {
>> - set_session_id(load_cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session);
>> + } else {
>> + arg->ret_origin = load_cmd.return_origin;
>> +
>> + if (arg->ret == TEEC_SUCCESS) {
>> + ret = get_ta_refcount(load_cmd.ta_handle);
>> + if (!ret) {
>> + arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS;
>> + arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
>> +
>> + /* Unload the TA on error */
>> + unload_cmd.ta_handle = load_cmd.ta_handle;
>> + psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA,
>> + (void *)&unload_cmd,
>> + sizeof(unload_cmd), &ret);
>> + } else {
>> + set_session_id(load_cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session);
>> + }
>> }
>> }
>> mutex_unlock(&ta_refcount_mutex);
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
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