Message-Id: <20230522203352.738576-5-jolsa@kernel.org>
Date:   Mon, 22 May 2023 22:33:48 +0200
From:   Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
To:     stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        bpf@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Tsahee Zidenberg <tsahee@...apurnalabs.com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Mahé Tardy <mahe.tardy@...valent.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 4/8] maccess: clarify kerneldoc comments

From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>

commit 4f6de12b375c37ba51f9412be7ed6ab44a7f71d8 upstream.

Add proper kerneldoc comments for probe_kernel_read_strict and
probe_kernel_read strncpy_from_unsafe_strict and explain the different
versus the non-strict version.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-5-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
---
 mm/maccess.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/maccess.c b/mm/maccess.c
index 3ca8d97e5010..d263c7b5e4eb 100644
--- a/mm/maccess.c
+++ b/mm/maccess.c
@@ -31,29 +31,36 @@ probe_write_common(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
 }
 
 /**
- * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from a kernel-space location
+ * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from any location
  * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
  * @src: address to read from
  * @size: size of the data chunk
  *
- * Safely read from address @src to the buffer at @dst.  If a kernel fault
- * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
+ * Same as probe_kernel_read_strict() except that for architectures with
+ * not fully separated user and kernel address spaces this function also works
+ * for user address tanges.
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE THIS FUNCTION - it is broken on architectures with entirely
+ * separate kernel and user address spaces, and also a bad idea otherwise.
+ */
+long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
+    __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
+
+/**
+ * probe_kernel_read_strict(): safely attempt to read from kernel-space
+ * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
+ * @src: address to read from
+ * @size: size of the data chunk
+ *
+ * Safely read from kernel address @src to the buffer at @dst.  If a kernel
+ * fault happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
  *
  * We ensure that the copy_from_user is executed in atomic context so that
  * do_page_fault() doesn't attempt to take mmap_sem.  This makes
  * probe_kernel_read() suitable for use within regions where the caller
  * already holds mmap_sem, or other locks which nest inside mmap_sem.
- *
- * probe_kernel_read_strict() is the same as probe_kernel_read() except for
- * the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
- * ranges: probe_kernel_read_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
- * probing memory on a user address range where probe_user_read() is supposed
- * to be used instead.
  */
 
-long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
-    __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
-
 long __weak probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
     __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
 
@@ -167,16 +174,35 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_user_write);
  * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
  * sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
  *
- * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() is the same as strncpy_from_unsafe() except
- * for the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
- * ranges: strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
- * probing memory on a user address range where strncpy_from_unsafe_user() is
- * supposed to be used instead.
+ * Same as strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() except that for architectures with
+ * not fully separated user and kernel address spaces this function also works
+ * for user address tanges.
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE THIS FUNCTION - it is broken on architectures with entirely
+ * separate kernel and user address spaces, and also a bad idea otherwise.
  */
 
 long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
     __attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
 
+/**
+ * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict: - Copy a NUL terminated string from unsafe
+ *				 address.
+ * @dst:   Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *         least @count bytes long.
+ * @unsafe_addr: Unsafe address.
+ * @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from unsafe address to kernel buffer.
+ *
+ * On success, returns the length of the string INCLUDING the trailing NUL.
+ *
+ * If access fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been copied
+ * and the trailing NUL added).
+ *
+ * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
+ * sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
+ */
 long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr,
 				       long count)
     __attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
-- 
2.40.1

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