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Message-ID: <0fa281a2628a4ab3fde5994379a0c1bc66bec123.camel@intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 22 May 2023 23:13:08 +0000
From:   "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>
To:     "Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@...gle.com>
CC:     "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@...el.com>,
        "andrew.cooper3@...rix.com" <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/18] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot
 iff callback is registered

On Mon, 2023-05-22 at 10:51 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, May 22, 2023, Kai Huang wrote:
> > On Fri, 2023-05-12 at 16:50 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > Attempt to disable virtualization during an emergency reboot if and only
> > > if there is a registered virt callback, i.e. iff a hypervisor (KVM) is
> > > active.  If there's no active hypervisor, then the CPU can't be operating
> > > with VMX or SVM enabled (barring an egregious bug).
> > > 
> > > Note, IRQs are disabled, which prevents KVM from coming along and enabling
> > > virtualization after the fact.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 3 +--
> > >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> > > index 92b380e199a3..20f7bdabc52e 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> > > @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
> > >  #include <asm/reboot_fixups.h>
> > >  #include <asm/reboot.h>
> > >  #include <asm/pci_x86.h>
> > > -#include <asm/virtext.h>
> > >  #include <asm/cpu.h>
> > >  #include <asm/nmi.h>
> > >  #include <asm/smp.h>
> > > @@ -545,7 +544,7 @@ static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
> > >  	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as
> > >  	 * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled.
> > >  	 */
> > > -	if (cpu_has_vmx() || cpu_has_svm(NULL)) {
> > > +	if (rcu_access_pointer(cpu_emergency_virt_callback)) {
> > >  		/* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX/SVM operation. */
> > >  		cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
> > 
> > 
> > IIUC, for cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization() itself, looks it's OK to not
> > having the pointer check, since it internally will do rcu_dereference() inside
> > RCU critical section anyway.
> > 
> > But nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart() is called after
> > cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(), and having the pointer check here can
> > avoid sending NMI to remote cpus if there's no active hypervisor.
> > 
> > Am I missing something?  If not, is it worth to call this out in changelog?
> 
> No, you're not missing anything.  I agree it's worth a line in the changelog.
> Dropping the "spurious" NMI should be a-ok, but explicitly calling out the side
> effect could be helpful for debug if something is silently relying on the NMI.

Yeah my thinking too.  Thanks.

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