linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 05/18] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot iff callback is registered

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Message-ID: <babc4cb3856dd5fc1bc6fa742e484667dc02c054.camel@intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 22 May 2023 13:04:39 +0000
From:   "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>
To:     "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@...gle.com>
CC:     "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@...el.com>,
        "andrew.cooper3@...rix.com" <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/18] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot
 iff callback is registered

On Fri, 2023-05-12 at 16:50 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Attempt to disable virtualization during an emergency reboot if and only
> if there is a registered virt callback, i.e. iff a hypervisor (KVM) is
> active.  If there's no active hypervisor, then the CPU can't be operating
> with VMX or SVM enabled (barring an egregious bug).
> 
> Note, IRQs are disabled, which prevents KVM from coming along and enabling
> virtualization after the fact.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 3 +--
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> index 92b380e199a3..20f7bdabc52e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
>  #include <asm/reboot_fixups.h>
>  #include <asm/reboot.h>
>  #include <asm/pci_x86.h>
> -#include <asm/virtext.h>
>  #include <asm/cpu.h>
>  #include <asm/nmi.h>
>  #include <asm/smp.h>
> @@ -545,7 +544,7 @@ static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
>  	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as
>  	 * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled.
>  	 */
> -	if (cpu_has_vmx() || cpu_has_svm(NULL)) {
> +	if (rcu_access_pointer(cpu_emergency_virt_callback)) {
>  		/* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX/SVM operation. */
>  		cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();


IIUC, for cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization() itself, looks it's OK to not
having the pointer check, since it internally will do rcu_dereference() inside
RCU critical section anyway.

But nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart() is called after
cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(), and having the pointer check here can
avoid sending NMI to remote cpus if there's no active hypervisor.

Am I missing something?  If not, is it worth to call this out in changelog?

>  
> -- 
> 2.40.1.606.ga4b1b128d6-goog
>