linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/3] KVM: x86: Disallow KVM_SET

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Message-ID: <20230622081953.jc4tw6cwczl7bc6j@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 22 Jun 2023 16:19:53 +0800
From:   Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        syzbot+5feef0b9ee9c8e9e5689@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] KVM: x86: Disallow KVM_SET_SREGS{2} if incoming CR0
 is invalid

On Tue, Jun 13, 2023 at 01:30:35PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Reject KVM_SET_SREGS{2} with -EINVAL if the incoming CR0 is invalid,
> e.g. due to setting bits 63:32, illegal combinations, or to a value that
> isn't allowed in VMX (non-)root mode.  The VMX checks in particular are
> "fun" as failure to disallow Real Mode for an L2 that is configured with
> unrestricted guest disabled, when KVM itself has unrestricted guest
> enabled, will result in KVM forcing VM86 mode to virtual Real Mode for
> L2, but then fail to unwind the related metadata when synthesizing a
> nested VM-Exit back to L1 (which has unrestricted guest enabled).
> 
> Opportunistically fix a benign typo in the prototype for is_valid_cr4().
> 
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Reported-by: syzbot+5feef0b9ee9c8e9e5689@...kaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000f316b705fdf6e2b4@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  3 ++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             |  6 ++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 28 ++++++++++++++++++------
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 | 34 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index 13bc212cd4bc..e3054e3e46d5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(get_segment)
>  KVM_X86_OP(get_cpl)
>  KVM_X86_OP(set_segment)
>  KVM_X86_OP(get_cs_db_l_bits)
> +KVM_X86_OP(is_valid_cr0)
>  KVM_X86_OP(set_cr0)
>  KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(post_set_cr3)
>  KVM_X86_OP(is_valid_cr4)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 28bd38303d70..3bc146dfd38d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1566,9 +1566,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>  	void (*set_segment)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  			    struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
>  	void (*get_cs_db_l_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l);
> +	bool (*is_valid_cr0)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
>  	void (*set_cr0)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
>  	void (*post_set_cr3)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3);
> -	bool (*is_valid_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
> +	bool (*is_valid_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
>  	void (*set_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
>  	int (*set_efer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
>  	void (*get_idt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index e265834fe859..b29d0650582e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1786,6 +1786,11 @@ static void sev_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static bool svm_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
> +{
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
>  void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
>  {
>  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> @@ -4815,6 +4820,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>  	.set_segment = svm_set_segment,
>  	.get_cpl = svm_get_cpl,
>  	.get_cs_db_l_bits = svm_get_cs_db_l_bits,
> +	.is_valid_cr0 = svm_is_valid_cr0,
>  	.set_cr0 = svm_set_cr0,
>  	.post_set_cr3 = sev_post_set_cr3,
>  	.is_valid_cr4 = svm_is_valid_cr4,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 0ecf4be2c6af..355b0e8c9b00 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -3037,6 +3037,15 @@ static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>  	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm);
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * KVM should never use VM86 to virtualize Real Mode when L2 is active,
> +	 * as using VM86 is unnecessary if unrestricted guest is enabled, and
> +	 * if unrestricted guest is disabled, VM-Enter (from L1) with CR0.PG=0
> +	 * should VM-Fail and KVM should reject userspace attempts to stuff

VM Enry shall fail(with CR0.PG=0), because SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST
will be cleared in L1's secondary_ctls_high MSR, and hence in its VMCS12?

When will an unrestricted L1 run L2 as a restricted one? Shadow on EPT(L0
uses EPT for L1 and L1 uses shadow for L2)?

> +	 * CR0.PG=0 when L2 is active.
> +	 */
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu));
> +

B.R.
Yu