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Message-ID: <20230628070418.6dky65allycok4us@yy-desk-7060>
Date:   Wed, 28 Jun 2023 15:04:19 +0800
From:   Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, x86@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
        peterz@...radead.org, tglx@...utronix.de, bp@...en8.de,
        mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        pbonzini@...hat.com, david@...hat.com, dan.j.williams@...el.com,
        rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com, ashok.raj@...el.com,
        reinette.chatre@...el.com, len.brown@...el.com, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        isaku.yamahata@...el.com, ying.huang@...el.com, chao.gao@...el.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, nik.borisov@...e.com,
        bagasdotme@...il.com, sagis@...gle.com, imammedo@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 00/22] TDX host kernel support

On Tue, Jun 27, 2023 at 02:12:30AM +1200, Kai Huang wrote:
> Intel Trusted Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
> host and certain physical attacks.  TDX specs are available in [1].
>
> This series is the initial support to enable TDX with minimal code to
> allow KVM to create and run TDX guests.  KVM support for TDX is being
> developed separately[2].  A new "userspace inaccessible memfd" approach
> to support TDX private memory is also being developed[3].  The KVM will
> only support the new "userspace inaccessible memfd" as TDX guest memory.
>
> Also, a few first generations of TDX hardware have an erratum[4], and
> require additional handing.
>
> This series doesn't aim to support all functionalities, and doesn't aim
> to resolve all things perfectly.  All other optimizations will be posted
> as follow-up once this initial TDX support is upstreamed.
>
> (For memory hotplug, sorry for broadcasting widely but I cc'ed the
> linux-mm@...ck.org following Kirill's suggestion so MM experts can also
> help to provide comments.)

.....

>
> == Design Considerations ==
>
> 1. Initialize the TDX module at runtime
>
> There are basically two ways the TDX module could be initialized: either
> in early boot, or at runtime before the first TDX guest is run.  This
> series implements the runtime initialization.
>
> Also, TDX requires a per-cpu initialization SEAMCALL to be done before
> making any SEAMCALL on that cpu.
>
> This series adds two functions: tdx_cpu_enable() and tdx_enable() to do
> per-cpu initialization and module initialization respectively.
>
> 2. CPU hotplug
>
> DX doesn't support physical (ACPI) CPU hotplug.  A non-buggy BIOS should
  ^^

Need T here.

> never support hotpluggable CPU devicee and/or deliver ACPI CPU hotplug
> event to the kernel.  This series doesn't handle physical (ACPI) CPU
> hotplug at all but depends on the BIOS to behave correctly.
>
> Also, tdx_cpu_enable() will simply return error for any hot-added cpu if
> something insane happened.
>
> Note TDX works with CPU logical online/offline, thus this series still
> allows to do logical CPU online/offline.
>
> 3. Kernel policy on TDX memory
>
> The TDX module reports a list of "Convertible Memory Region" (CMR) to
> indicate which memory regions are TDX-capable.  The TDX architecture
> allows the VMM to designate specific convertible memory regions as usable
> for TDX private memory.
>
> The initial support of TDX guests will only allocate TDX private memory
> from the global page allocator.  This series chooses to designate _all_
> system RAM in the core-mm at the time of initializing TDX module as TDX
> memory to guarantee all pages in the page allocator are TDX pages.
>
> 4. Memory Hotplug
>
> After the kernel passes all "TDX-usable" memory regions to the TDX
> module, the set of "TDX-usable" memory regions are fixed during module's
> runtime.  No more "TDX-usable" memory can be added to the TDX module
> after that.
>
> To achieve above "to guarantee all pages in the page allocator are TDX
> pages", this series simply choose to reject any non-TDX-usable memory in
> memory hotplug.
>
> 5. Physical Memory Hotplug
>
> Note TDX assumes convertible memory is always physically present during
> machine's runtime.  A non-buggy BIOS should never support hot-removal of
> any convertible memory.  This implementation doesn't handle ACPI memory
> removal but depends on the BIOS to behave correctly.
>
> Also, if something insane really happened, 4) makes sure either TDX

Please remove "4)" if have no specific meaning here.

> cannot be enabled or hot-added memory will be rejected after TDX gets
> enabled.
>
> 6. Kexec()
>
> Similar to AMD's SME, in kexec() kernel needs to flush dirty cachelines
> of TDX private memory otherwise they may silently corrupt the new kernel.
>
> 7. TDX erratum
>
> The first few generations of TDX hardware have an erratum.  A partial
> write to a TDX private memory cacheline will silently "poison" the
> line.  Subsequent reads will consume the poison and generate a machine
> check.
>
> The fast warm reset reboot doesn't reset TDX private memory.  With this
> erratum, all TDX private pages needs to be converted back to normal
> before a fast warm reset reboot or booting to the new kernel in kexec().
> Otherwise, the new kernel may get unexpected machine check.
>
> In normal condition, triggering the erratum in Linux requires some kind
> of kernel bug involving relatively exotic memory writes to TDX private
> memory and will manifest via spurious-looking machine checks when
> reading the affected memory.  Machine check handler is improved to deal
> with such machine check.
>
>
> [1]: TDX specs
> https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
>
> [2]: KVM TDX basic feature support
> https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/cover.1685333727.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com/T/#t
>
> [3]: KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM
> https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/
>
> [4]: TDX erratum
> https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/772415?explicitVersion=true
>
>
>
>
> Kai Huang (22):
>   x86/tdx: Define TDX supported page sizes as macros
>   x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot
>   x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC
>   x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check erratum
>   x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL infrastructure
>   x86/virt/tdx: Handle SEAMCALL running out of entropy error
>   x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to enable TDX on demand
>   x86/virt/tdx: Get information about TDX module and TDX-capable memory
>   x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as
>     TDX memory
>   x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs to cover all TDX
>     memory regions
>   x86/virt/tdx: Fill out TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions
>   x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs
>   x86/virt/tdx: Designate reserved areas for all TDMRs
>   x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with the TDMRs and global KeyID
>   x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages
>   x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs
>   x86/kexec: Flush cache of TDX private memory
>   x86/virt/tdx: Keep TDMRs when module initialization is successful
>   x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum
>   x86/virt/tdx: Allow SEAMCALL to handle #UD and #GP
>   x86/mce: Improve error log of kernel space TDX #MC due to erratum
>   Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support
>
>  Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst     |  189 +++-
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                   |   15 +
>  arch/x86/Makefile                  |    2 +
>  arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c            |    6 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |    3 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h         |   26 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |   17 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c     |   33 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c |    9 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |    7 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c           |   15 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    2 +
>  arch/x86/virt/Makefile             |    2 +
>  arch/x86/virt/vmx/Makefile         |    2 +
>  arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile     |    2 +
>  arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S   |   52 +
>  arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c        | 1542 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h        |  151 +++
>  arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S    |   19 +-
>  20 files changed, 2078 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
>
>
> base-commit: 94142c9d1bdf1c18027a42758ceb6bdd59a92012
> --
> 2.40.1
>

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