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Message-ID: <20230703155237eucms1p4dfb6a19caa14c79eb6c823d127b39024@eucms1p4>
Date: Mon, 03 Jul 2023 17:52:37 +0200
From: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@...sung.com>
To: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC: "rostedt@...dmis.org" <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
"mhiramat@...nel.org" <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] trace: fix null pointer dereference in
tracing_err_log_open()
>From d6ef949d29b884dd77fe5e628dc71318de08868c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@...sung.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 17:48:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] trace: fix null pointer dereference in tracing_err_log_open()
Fix an issue in function 'tracing_err_log_open'.
The function doesn't call 'seq_open' if file is opened only with
write permissions, which results in 'file->private_data' being left at null.
If we then use 'lseek' on that opened file, 'seq_lseek' dereferences
'file->private_data' in 'mutex_lock(&m->lock)', resulting in a Kernel panic.
Writing to this node requires root privilages, therefore this bug
has very little security impact.
Tracefs node: /sys/kernel/tracing/error_log
Example Kernel panic:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000038
Call trace:
mutex_lock+0x30/0x110
seq_lseek+0x34/0xb8
__arm64_sys_lseek+0x6c/0xb8
invoke_syscall+0x58/0x13c
el0_svc_common+0xc4/0x10c
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x98
el0_svc+0x24/0x88
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
Code: d503201f aa0803e0 aa1f03e1 aa0103e9 (c8e97d02)
---[ end trace 561d1b49c12cf8a5 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@...sung.com>
---
kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 5d2c5678b..bfa8e2d01 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -8097,8 +8097,16 @@ static int tracing_err_log_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
return ret;
/* If this file was opened for write, then erase contents */
- if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC))
+ if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) {
clear_tracing_err_log(tr);
+ ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
+ if (!ret) {
+ struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
+ m->private = tr;
+ } else {
+ trace_array_put(tr);
+ }
+ }
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
base-commit: 1ef6663a587ba3e57dc5065a477db1c64481eedd
--
2.25.1
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