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Message-ID: <20230703121823.5d96c1cb@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 12:18:23 -0400
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@...sung.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"mhiramat@...nel.org" <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] trace: fix null pointer dereference in
tracing_err_log_open()
On Mon, 03 Jul 2023 17:52:37 +0200
Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@...sung.com> wrote:
> >From d6ef949d29b884dd77fe5e628dc71318de08868c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@...sung.com>
> Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 17:48:40 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] trace: fix null pointer dereference in tracing_err_log_open()
>
> Fix an issue in function 'tracing_err_log_open'.
> The function doesn't call 'seq_open' if file is opened only with
> write permissions, which results in 'file->private_data' being left at null.
> If we then use 'lseek' on that opened file, 'seq_lseek' dereferences
> 'file->private_data' in 'mutex_lock(&m->lock)', resulting in a Kernel panic.
> Writing to this node requires root privilages, therefore this bug
> has very little security impact.
>
> Tracefs node: /sys/kernel/tracing/error_log
>
Nice catch, but I recommend a different solution.
> Example Kernel panic:
>
> Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000038
> Call trace:
> mutex_lock+0x30/0x110
> seq_lseek+0x34/0xb8
> __arm64_sys_lseek+0x6c/0xb8
> invoke_syscall+0x58/0x13c
> el0_svc_common+0xc4/0x10c
> do_el0_svc+0x24/0x98
> el0_svc+0x24/0x88
> el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
> el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
> Code: d503201f aa0803e0 aa1f03e1 aa0103e9 (c8e97d02)
> ---[ end trace 561d1b49c12cf8a5 ]---
> Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
>
> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@...sung.com>
> ---
> kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 +++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> index 5d2c5678b..bfa8e2d01 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> @@ -8097,8 +8097,16 @@ static int tracing_err_log_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> return ret;
>
> /* If this file was opened for write, then erase contents */
> - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC))
> + if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) {
> clear_tracing_err_log(tr);
> + ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
> + if (!ret) {
> + struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
> + m->private = tr;
> + } else {
> + trace_array_put(tr);
> + }
> + }
>
> if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
> ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
>
> base-commit: 1ef6663a587ba3e57dc5065a477db1c64481eedd
I believe this can be better fixed by:
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 64a4dde073ef..999b7c73e324 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -8135,7 +8135,7 @@ static const struct file_operations tracing_err_log_fops = {
.open = tracing_err_log_open,
.write = tracing_err_log_write,
.read = seq_read,
- .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .llseek = tracing_lseek,
.release = tracing_err_log_release,
};
as that tracing_lseek() is for this exact scenario.
Care to send a v2?
Thanks,
-- Steve
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