linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs

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Message-ID: <ZMkj/HORmSy685cH@johallen-workstation>
Date:   Tue, 1 Aug 2023 10:25:48 -0500
From:   John Allen <john.allen@....com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        pbonzini@...hat.com, weijiang.yang@...el.com,
        rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, x86@...nel.org,
        thomas.lendacky@....com, bp@...en8.de
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs

On Fri, Jun 23, 2023 at 05:05:18PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, May 24, 2023, John Allen wrote:
> > If kvm supports shadow stack, pass through shadow stack MSRs to improve
> > guest performance.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  2 +-
> >  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > index 6df486bb1ac4..cdbce20989b8 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > @@ -136,6 +136,13 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
> >  	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT),		.always = false },
> >  	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT),		.always = false },
> >  	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR),		.always = false },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_U_CET,                      .always = false },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_S_CET,                      .always = false },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,                .always = false },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP,                    .always = false },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP,                    .always = false },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP,                    .always = false },
> > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP,                    .always = false },
> >  	{ .index = MSR_INVALID,				.always = false },
> >  };
> >  
> > @@ -1181,6 +1188,16 @@ static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >  		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 1, 1);
> >  		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 1, 1);
> >  	}
> > +
> > +	if (kvm_cet_user_supported() && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_U_CET, 1, 1);
> > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_S_CET, 1, 1);
> > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, 1, 1);
> > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, 1, 1);
> > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, 1, 1);
> > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, 1, 1);
> > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 1, 1);
> > +	}
> 
> This is wrong, KVM needs to set/clear interception based on SHSKT, i.e. it can't
> be a one-way street.  Userspace *probably* won't toggle SHSTK in guest CPUID, but
> weirder things have happened.

Can you clarify what you mean by that? Do you mean that we need to check
both guest_cpuid_has and kvm_cpu_cap_has like the guest_can_use function
that is used in Weijiang Yang's series? Or is there something else I'm
omitting here?

static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                          unsigned int feature)
{
        return kvm_cpu_cap_has(feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, feature);
}