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Message-ID: <ZNO/pf/pH5jJAZI0@elver.google.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 18:32:37 +0200
From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Guenter Roeck <linux@...ck-us.net>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@...wei.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>, Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-toolchains@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] list_debug: Introduce CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST_MINIMAL
On Wed, Aug 09, 2023 at 11:30AM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
[...]
>
> I would actually prefer DEBUG_LIST to select HARDEN_LIST and not the other
> way around. It logically doesn't make sense that HARDEN_LIST would select
> DEBUG_LIST. That is, I could by default want HARDEN_LIST always on, but not
> DEBUG_LIST (because who knows, it may add other features I don't want). But
> then, I may have stumbled over something and want more info, and enable
> DEBUG_LIST (while still having HARDEN_LIST) enabled.
>
> I think you are looking at this from an implementation perspective and not
> the normal developer one.
>
[...]
>
> That is, if DEBUG_LIST is enabled, we always call the
> __list_add_valid_or_report(), but if only HARDEN_LIST is enabled, then we
> do the shortcut.
Good point - I think this is better. See below tentative v4.
Kees: Does that also look more like what you had in mind?
Thanks,
-- Marco
------ >8 ------
From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 22:19:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] list: Introduce CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST
Numerous production kernel configs (see [1, 2]) are choosing to enable
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, which is also being recommended by KSPP for hardened
configs [3]. The motivation behind this is that the option can be used
as a security hardening feature (e.g. CVE-2019-2215 and CVE-2019-2025
are mitigated by the option [4]).
The feature has never been designed with performance in mind, yet common
list manipulation is happening across hot paths all over the kernel.
Introduce CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST, which performs list pointer checking
inline, and only upon list corruption calls the reporting slow path.
Since DEBUG_LIST is functionally a superset of HARDEN_LIST, the Kconfig
variables are designed to reflect that: DEBUG_LIST selects HARDEN_LIST,
whereas HARDEN_LIST itself has no dependency on DEBUG_LIST.
To generate optimal machine code with CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST:
1. Elide checking for pointer values which upon dereference would
result in an immediate access fault -- therefore "minimal" checks.
The trade-off is lower-quality error reports.
2. Use the newly introduced __preserve_most function attribute
(available with Clang, but not yet with GCC) to minimize the code
footprint for calling the reporting slow path. As a result,
function size of callers is reduced by avoiding saving registers
before calling the rarely called reporting slow path.
Note that all TUs in lib/Makefile already disable function tracing,
including list_debug.c, and __preserve_most's implied notrace has
no effect in this case.
3. Because the inline checks are a subset of the full set of checks in
__list_*_valid_or_report(), always return false if the inline
checks failed. This avoids redundant compare and conditional
branch right after return from the slow path.
As a side-effect of the checks being inline, if the compiler can prove
some condition to always be true, it can completely elide some checks.
Running netperf with CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST (using a Clang compiler with
"preserve_most") shows throughput improvements, in my case of ~7% on
average (up to 20-30% on some test cases).
Link: https://r.android.com/1266735 [1]
Link: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/blob/main/config [2]
Link: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings [3]
Link: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/11/bad-binder-android-in-wild-exploit.html [4]
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
---
v4:
* Rename to CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST, which can independently be selected from
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST.
v3:
* Rename ___list_*_valid() to __list_*_valid_or_report().
* More comments.
v2:
* Note that lib/Makefile disables function tracing for everything and
__preserve_most's implied notrace is a noop here.
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/list_debug.c | 2 +
include/linux/list.h | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
lib/Kconfig.debug | 9 +++-
lib/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/list_debug.c | 5 ++-
security/Kconfig.hardening | 13 ++++++
7 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
index 9ddc025e4b86..c89c85a41ac4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ hyp-obj-y := timer-sr.o sysreg-sr.o debug-sr.o switch.o tlb.o hyp-init.o host.o
cache.o setup.o mm.o mem_protect.o sys_regs.o pkvm.o stacktrace.o ffa.o
hyp-obj-y += ../vgic-v3-sr.o ../aarch32.o ../vgic-v2-cpuif-proxy.o ../entry.o \
../fpsimd.o ../hyp-entry.o ../exception.o ../pgtable.o
-hyp-obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
+hyp-obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST) += list_debug.o
hyp-obj-y += $(lib-objs)
##
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/list_debug.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/list_debug.c
index 16266a939a4c..46a2d4f2b3c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/list_debug.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/list_debug.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static inline __must_check bool nvhe_check_data_corruption(bool v)
/* The predicates checked here are taken from lib/list_debug.c. */
+__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next)
{
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
return true;
}
+__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry)
{
struct list_head *prev, *next;
diff --git a/include/linux/list.h b/include/linux/list.h
index 130c6a1bb45c..ef899c27c68b 100644
--- a/include/linux/list.h
+++ b/include/linux/list.h
@@ -38,39 +38,91 @@ static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)
WRITE_ONCE(list->prev, list);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST
+
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST
+# define __list_valid_slowpath
+#else
+# define __list_valid_slowpath __cold __preserve_most
+#endif
+
/*
* Performs the full set of list corruption checks before __list_add().
* On list corruption reports a warning, and returns false.
*/
-extern bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new,
- struct list_head *prev,
- struct list_head *next);
+extern bool __list_valid_slowpath __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new,
+ struct list_head *prev,
+ struct list_head *next);
/*
* Performs list corruption checks before __list_add(). Returns false if a
* corruption is detected, true otherwise.
+ *
+ * With CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST only, performs minimal list integrity checking (that
+ * do not result in a fault) inline, and only if a corruption is detected calls
+ * the reporting function __list_add_valid_or_report().
*/
static __always_inline bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new,
struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next)
{
- return __list_add_valid_or_report(new, prev, next);
+ bool ret = true;
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST)) {
+ /*
+ * With the hardening version, elide checking if next and prev
+ * are NULL, since the immediate dereference of them below would
+ * result in a fault if NULL.
+ *
+ * With the reduced set of checks, we can afford to inline the
+ * checks, which also gives the compiler a chance to elide some
+ * of them completely if they can be proven at compile-time. If
+ * one of the pre-conditions does not hold, the slow-path will
+ * show a report which pre-condition failed.
+ */
+ if (likely(next->prev == prev && prev->next == next && new != prev && new != next))
+ return true;
+ ret = false;
+ }
+
+ ret &= __list_add_valid_or_report(new, prev, next);
+ return ret;
}
/*
* Performs the full set of list corruption checks before __list_del_entry().
* On list corruption reports a warning, and returns false.
*/
-extern bool __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry);
+extern bool __list_valid_slowpath __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry);
/*
* Performs list corruption checks before __list_del_entry(). Returns false if a
* corruption is detected, true otherwise.
+ *
+ * With CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST only, performs minimal list integrity checking (that
+ * do not result in a fault) inline, and only if a corruption is detected calls
+ * the reporting function __list_del_entry_valid_or_report().
*/
static __always_inline bool __list_del_entry_valid(struct list_head *entry)
{
- return __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(entry);
+ bool ret = true;
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST)) {
+ struct list_head *prev = entry->prev;
+ struct list_head *next = entry->next;
+
+ /*
+ * With the hardening version, elide checking if next and prev
+ * are NULL, LIST_POISON1 or LIST_POISON2, since the immediate
+ * dereference of them below would result in a fault.
+ */
+ if (likely(prev->next == entry && next->prev == entry))
+ return true;
+ ret = false;
+ }
+
+ ret &= __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(entry);
+ return ret;
}
#else
static inline bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new,
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index fbc89baf7de6..9e38956d6f50 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1674,9 +1674,14 @@ menu "Debug kernel data structures"
config DEBUG_LIST
bool "Debug linked list manipulation"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ select HARDEN_LIST
help
- Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list
- walking routines.
+ Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list walking
+ routines.
+
+ This option trades better quality error reports for performance, and
+ is more suitable for kernel debugging. If you care about performance,
+ you should only enable CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST instead.
If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 42d307ade225..a7ebc9090f04 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE) += interval_tree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_LIST) += list_debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BITREVERSE) += bitrev.o
diff --git a/lib/list_debug.c b/lib/list_debug.c
index 2def33b1491f..38ddc7c01eab 100644
--- a/lib/list_debug.c
+++ b/lib/list_debug.c
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
* Copyright 2006, Red Hat, Inc., Dave Jones
* Released under the General Public License (GPL).
*
- * This file contains the linked list validation for DEBUG_LIST.
+ * This file contains the linked list validation and error reporting for
+ * HARDEN_LIST and DEBUG_LIST.
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
* attempt).
*/
+__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next)
{
@@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__list_add_valid_or_report);
+__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry)
{
struct list_head *prev, *next;
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 0f295961e773..19aa2b7d2f64 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -279,6 +279,19 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
endmenu
+menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"
+
+config HARDEN_LIST
+ bool "Check integrity of linked list manipulation"
+ help
+ Minimal integrity checking in the linked-list manipulation routines
+ to catch memory corruptions that are not guaranteed to result in an
+ immediate access fault.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+endmenu
+
config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
# Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until
--
2.41.0.640.ga95def55d0-goog
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