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Message-ID: <169217251568.27769.3504995608480815585.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:55:15 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: a3fd3ac0a605e27484b1e8aaa9560972800e6706
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/a3fd3ac0a605e27484b1e8aaa9560972800e6706
Author: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
AuthorDate: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 13:44:33 +02:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 09:39:16 +02:00
x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1
For a more consistent namespace.
[ bp: Fixup names in the doc too. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121148.976236447@infradead.org
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 ++---
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 8 +++----
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 24 ++++++++++-----------
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
index af59a93..b6cfb51 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
-untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
-function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
+untraining function srso_alias_untrain_ret() and the safe return
+function srso_alias_safe_ret() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 8a0d4c5..f7c3375 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
- "call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+ "call srso_alias_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
#endif
.endm
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
- "call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+ "call srso_alias_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
#endif
.endm
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
extern void retbleed_untrain_ret(void);
extern void srso_untrain_ret(void);
-extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void);
+extern void srso_alias_untrain_ret(void);
extern void entry_ibpb(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 7c0e2b4..83d41c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -147,10 +147,10 @@ SECTIONS
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
/*
- * See the comment above srso_untrain_ret_alias()'s
+ * See the comment above srso_alias_untrain_ret()'s
* definition.
*/
- . = srso_untrain_ret_alias | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20);
+ . = srso_alias_untrain_ret | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20);
*(.text..__x86.rethunk_safe)
#endif
ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END
@@ -536,8 +536,8 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
* Instead do: (A | B) - (A & B) in order to compute the XOR
* of the two function addresses:
*/
-. = ASSERT(((ABSOLUTE(srso_untrain_ret_alias) | srso_safe_ret_alias) -
- (ABSOLUTE(srso_untrain_ret_alias) & srso_safe_ret_alias)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)),
+. = ASSERT(((ABSOLUTE(srso_alias_untrain_ret) | srso_alias_safe_ret) -
+ (ABSOLUTE(srso_alias_untrain_ret) & srso_alias_safe_ret)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)),
"SRSO function pair won't alias");
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 2cf7c51..d37e5ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -133,56 +133,56 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
/*
- * srso_untrain_ret_alias() and srso_safe_ret_alias() are placed at
+ * srso_alias_untrain_ret() and srso_alias_safe_ret() are placed at
* special addresses:
*
- * - srso_untrain_ret_alias() is 2M aligned
- * - srso_safe_ret_alias() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14
+ * - srso_alias_untrain_ret() is 2M aligned
+ * - srso_alias_safe_ret() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14
* and 20 in its virtual address are set (while those bits in the
- * srso_untrain_ret_alias() function are cleared).
+ * srso_alias_untrain_ret() function are cleared).
*
* This guarantees that those two addresses will alias in the branch
* target buffer of Zen3/4 generations, leading to any potential
* poisoned entries at that BTB slot to get evicted.
*
- * As a result, srso_safe_ret_alias() becomes a safe return.
+ * As a result, srso_alias_safe_ret() becomes a safe return.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
.section .text..__x86.rethunk_untrain
-SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+SYM_START(srso_alias_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
ASM_NOP2
lfence
jmp srso_alias_return_thunk
-SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
-__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
+__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
.section .text..__x86.rethunk_safe
#else
/* dummy definition for alternatives */
-SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+SYM_START(srso_alias_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
int3
SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
#endif
-SYM_START(srso_safe_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+SYM_START(srso_alias_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
int3
-SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias)
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_safe_ret)
.section .text..__x86.return_thunk
SYM_CODE_START(srso_alias_return_thunk)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
- call srso_safe_ret_alias
+ call srso_alias_safe_ret
ud2
SYM_CODE_END(srso_alias_return_thunk)
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