linux-kernel - Re: [RFC, PATCH 1/1] rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) driver

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Message-ID: <CAFA6WYMLuvmXcc3FVoT_mOPsBrjPc3ucSoLK6qY_5995+ygHDw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 21 Aug 2023 17:24:59 +0530
From:   Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To:     Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
Cc:     Shyam Saini <shyamsaini@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@...aro.org>,
        Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@...aro.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mmc@...r.kernel.org,
        op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org, linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
        Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@...aro.org>,
        Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@...el.com>,
        Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd.bergmann@...aro.org>,
        Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@...aro.org>,
        Tyler Hicks <code@...icks.com>,
        "Srivatsa S . Bhat" <srivatsa@...il.mit.edu>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Allen Pais <apais@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH 1/1] rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) driver

On Mon, 21 Aug 2023 at 16:49, Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 21, 2023 at 12:03 PM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 21 Aug 2023 at 15:19, Jerome Forissier
> > <jerome.forissier@...aro.org> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On 8/17/23 01:31, Shyam Saini wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hi Ulf,
> > > >
> > > >> On Sat, 22 Jul 2023 at 03:41, Shyam Saini
> > > >> <shyamsaini@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> > > >>>
> > > >>> From: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@...aro.org>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> [This is patch 1 from [1] Alex's submission and this RPMB layer was
> > > >>> originally proposed by [2]Thomas Winkler ]
> > > >>>
> > > >>> A number of storage technologies support a specialised hardware
> > > >>> partition designed to be resistant to replay attacks. The underlying
> > > >>> HW protocols differ but the operations are common. The RPMB partition
> > > >>> cannot be accessed via standard block layer, but by a set of specific
> > > >>> commands: WRITE, READ, GET_WRITE_COUNTER, and PROGRAM_KEY. Such a
> > > >>> partition provides authenticated and replay protected access, hence
> > > >>> suitable as a secure storage.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> The initial aim of this patch is to provide a simple RPMB Driver which
> > > >>> can be accessed by Linux's optee driver to facilitate fast-path for
> > > >>> RPMB access to optee OS(secure OS) during the boot time. [1] Currently,
> > > >>> Optee OS relies on user-tee supplicant to access eMMC RPMB partition.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> A TEE device driver can claim the RPMB interface, for example, via
> > > >>> class_interface_register(). The RPMB driver provides a series of
> > > >>> operations for interacting with the device.
> > > >>
> > > >> I don't quite follow this. More exactly, how will the TEE driver know
> > > >> what RPMB device it should use?
> > > >
> > > > I don't have complete code to for this yet, but i think OP-TEE driver
> > > > should register with RPMB subsystem and then we can have eMMC/UFS/NVMe
> > > > specific implementation for RPMB operations.
> > > >
> > > > Linux optee driver can handle RPMB frames and pass it to RPMB subsystem
> > > >
> >
> > It would be better to have this OP-TEE use case fully implemented. So
> > that we can justify it as a valid user for this proposed RPMB
> > subsystem. If you are looking for any further suggestions then please
> > let us know.
>
> +1
>
> >
> > > > [1] U-Boot has mmc specific implementation
> > > >
> > > > I think OPTEE-OS has CFG_RPMB_FS_DEV_ID option
> > > > CFG_RPMB_FS_DEV_ID=1 for /dev/mmcblk1rpmb,
> > >
> > > Correct. Note that tee-supplicant will ignore this device ID if --rmb-cid
> > > is given and use the specified RPMB instead (the CID is a non-ambiguous way
> > > to identify a RPMB device).
> > >
> > > > but in case if a
> > > > system has multiple RPMB devices such as UFS/eMMC/NVMe, one them
> > > > should be declared as secure storage and optee should access that one only.
> > >
> > > Indeed, that would be an equivalent of tee-supplicant's --rpmb-cid.
> > >
> > > > Sumit, do you have suggestions for this ?
> > >
> >
> > I would suggest having an OP-TEE secure DT property that would provide
> > the RPMB CID which is allocated to the secure world.
>
> Another option is for OP-TEE to iterate over all RPMBs with a
> programmed key and test if the key OP-TEE would use works.

That would require intercepting OP-TEE RPMB frames such that any
"write key" frame is blocked. As we don't want OP-TEE to occupy
unprovisioned RPMB partitions.

> That should
> avoid the problem of provisioning a device-unique secure DTB.

Okay I see the scalability concerns. So how about instead we have a
UFS/eMMC/NVMe controller specific boolean secure RPMB DT property?

> I'd
> expect that the RPMB key is programmed by a trusted provisioning tool
> since allowing OP-TEE to program the RPMB key has never been secure,
> not unless the OP-TEE binary is rollback protected.

Agree but any such RPMB key provisioning tool should either belong to
OP-TEE, u-boot or Linux.

-Sumit

>
> Cheers,
> Jens
>
> >
> > -Sumit
> >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Jerome