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Message-ID: <20230822060706.GEZORQiq136ZR5Tnc0@fat_crate.local>
Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2023 08:07:06 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Babu Moger <babu.moger@....com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, David.Kaplan@....com,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for
spec_rstack_overflow=off
On Tue, Aug 22, 2023 at 07:54:52AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> If you goto pred_cmd, you will overwrite it with PRED_CMD_SBPB here.
Looking at this more:
"If SRSO mitigation is not required or is disabled, software may use
SBPB on context/virtual machine switch to help protect against
vulnerabilities like Spectre v2."
I think we actually want this overwrite to happen.
But then if retbleed=ibpb, entry_ibpb() will do bit 0 unconditionally...
Hmm, lemme talk to people.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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