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Message-ID: <20a588ca-baee-e94b-11d6-d1f56c695c5b@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2023 14:10:44 -0400
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
casey@...aufler-ca.com
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 14/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook
On 9/4/23 09:34, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>
> In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the
> file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS.
>
> It is useful for IMA to calculate the digest of the file content, and to
> decide based on that digest whether the file should be made accessible to
> the requesting process.
>
> LSMs should use this hook instead of file_open, if they need to make their
> decision based on an opened file (for example by inspecting the file
> content). The file is not open yet in the file_open hook. The new hook can
> return an error and can cause the open to be aborted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
> fs/namei.c | 2 ++
> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 ++++++
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 1f5ec71360de..7dc4626859f0 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -3634,6 +3634,8 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
> error = may_open(idmap, &nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
> if (!error && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))
> error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
> + if (!error)
> + error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
> if (!error)
> error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
> if (!error && do_truncate)
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> index 8a2321d19194..3450bb1c8a18 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> @@ -862,6 +862,12 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
> goto out_nfserr;
> }
>
> + host_err = security_file_post_open(file, may_flags);
> + if (host_err) {
> + fput(file);
> + goto out_nfserr;
> + }
> +
> host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
> if (host_err) {
> fput(file);
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 1153e7163b8b..60ed33f0c80d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk,
> struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task,
> unsigned long clone_flags)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 665bba3e0081..a0f16511c059 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
> struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
> int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
> int security_file_open(struct file *file);
> +int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask);
> int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
> int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
> @@ -1044,6 +1045,11 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3947159ba5e9..3e0078b51e46 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2856,6 +2856,23 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
> return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_file_post_open() - Recheck access to a file after it has been opened
> + * @file: the file
> + * @mask: access mask
> + *
> + * Recheck access with mask after the file has been opened. The hook is useful
> + * for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to make
> + * decisions.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(file_post_open, 0, file, mask);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
> +
> /**
> * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
> * @file: file
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