linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec

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Message-ID: <f4228262-02f9-3af5-8ef5-be109b5d3d13@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 6 Oct 2023 14:24:11 -0500
From:   "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on
 kexec


On 10/5/2023 5:28 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 05, 2023 at 05:01:23PM -0500, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>> On 10/5/2023 4:28 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>> On Thu, Oct 05, 2023 at 01:41:38PM -0500, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>>>>> +static void unshare_all_memory(bool unmap)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +	unsigned long addr, end;
>>>>> +	long found = 0, shared;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +	/*
>>>>> +	 * Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private,
>>>>> +	 */
>>>>> +
>>>>> +	addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
>>>>> +	end  = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
>>>>> +
>>>>> +	while (addr < end) {
>>>>> +		unsigned long size;
>>>>> +		unsigned int level;
>>>>> +		pte_t *pte;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +		pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
>>>>
>>>> IIRC, you were earlier walking the direct mapping using
>>>> walk_page_range_novma(), any particular reason to use lookup_address()
>>>> instead ?
>>>
>>> walk_page_range_novma() wants mmap lock to be taken, but it is tricky as
>>> we run here from atomic context in case of crash.
>>>
>>> I considered using trylock to bypass the limitation, but it is a hack.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> +		size = page_level_size(level);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +		if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte)) {
>>>>
>>>> Additionally need to add check for pte_none() here to handle physical memory
>>>> holes in direct mapping.
>>>
>>> lookup_address() returns NULL for none entries.
>>>
>>
>> Looking at lookup_address_in_pgd(), at pte level it is simply returning
>> pte_offset_kernel() and there does not seem to be a check for returning NULL
>> if pte_none() ?
> 
> Hm. You are right.
> 
> I think it yet another quirk in how lookup_address() implemented. We need
> to make it straight too.
> 
> There's two options: either make lookup_address() return pointer for entry
> even if it is NULL, or add check for pte_none() after pte_offset_kernel()
> and return NULL if it is true.
> 
> I like the first option more as it allows caller to populate the entry if
> it wants.

Yes, i like the first option.

> 
>>>>> +			int pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +			/*
>>>>> +			 * Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit
>>>>> +			 * conversion to shared.
>>>>> +			 *
>>>>> +			 * Make sure nobody touches the shared range from
>>>>> +			 * now on.
>>>>> +			 *
>>>>> +			 * Bypass unmapping for crash scenario. Unmapping
>>>>> +			 * requires sleepable context, but in crash case kernel
>>>>> +			 * hits the code path with interrupts disabled.
>>>>
>>>> In case of SNP we will need to temporarily enable interrupts during this
>>>> unsharing as we invoke set_memory_encrypted() which then hits a BUG_ON() in
>>>> cpa_flush() if interrupts are disabled.
>>>
>>> Do you really need full set_memory_encrypted()? Can't you do something
>>> ligher?
>>>
>> We need to modify the PTE for setting c-bit to 1 so that will require
>> cpa_flush(), though probably can add something lighter to do
>> clflush_cache_range() directly ?
> 
> For TDX, I don't touch shared bit as nobody suppose to touch the memory
> after the point (ans set_memory_np() enforces it for !crash case).
> 
> Can't SNP do the same?
> 

No, we need to make the PSC call for HV to update the RMP, then set 
C-bit=1 in the PTE and then do a PVALIDATE to switch the page back to 
private, so it needs something like a full set_memory_encrypted().

Thanks,
Ashish