linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 15/23] security: Introduce inode_post_create

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Message-ID: <7e2ce7e0-7b04-4953-9fbc-3cde20d8c89e@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:   Tue, 7 Nov 2023 09:42:51 -0800
From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
        viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
        chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
        kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
        paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
        dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
        mic@...ikod.net
Cc:     linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 15/23] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile
 hook

On 11/7/2023 5:40 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>
> In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook.
>
> As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new
> files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security
> xattr.
>
> LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created.
>
> The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> canceled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>


> ---
>  fs/namei.c                    |  1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
>  include/linux/security.h      |  6 ++++++
>  security/security.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index b7f433720b1e..adb3ab27951a 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -3686,6 +3686,7 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  		inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE;
>  		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
>  	}
> +	security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
>  	ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index e491951399f7..ec5319ec2e85 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
>  	 const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	 umode_t mode)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_create_tmpfile, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +	 struct inode *inode)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
>  	 struct dentry *new_dentry)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 68cbdc84506e..0c85f0337a9e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
>  				      const struct qstr *name,
>  				      const struct inode *context_inode);
>  int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
> +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +					struct inode *inode);
>  int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
>  			 struct dentry *new_dentry);
>  int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> @@ -809,6 +811,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline void
> +security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode)
> +{ }
> +
>  static inline int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
>  				       struct inode *dir,
>  				       struct dentry *new_dentry)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5eaf5f2aa5ea..ca650c285fd9 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2013,6 +2013,21 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
>  
> +/**
> + * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile
> + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> + * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile
> + *
> + * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
> + */
> +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +					struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
> +		return;
> +	call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
>   * @old_dentry: existing file