[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <8aa35b4e-6bf1-461b-8d7a-5331dfdc3934@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 17:03:55 +0800
From: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
To: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>,
"joro@...tes.org" <joro@...tes.org>,
"alex.williamson@...hat.com" <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
"jgg@...dia.com" <jgg@...dia.com>,
"robin.murphy@....com" <robin.murphy@....com>,
"baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com" <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
CC: "cohuck@...hat.com" <cohuck@...hat.com>,
"eric.auger@...hat.com" <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
"nicolinc@...dia.com" <nicolinc@...dia.com>,
"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
"mjrosato@...ux.ibm.com" <mjrosato@...ux.ibm.com>,
"chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com" <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
"yi.y.sun@...ux.intel.com" <yi.y.sun@...ux.intel.com>,
"peterx@...hat.com" <peterx@...hat.com>,
"jasowang@...hat.com" <jasowang@...hat.com>,
"shameerali.kolothum.thodi@...wei.com"
<shameerali.kolothum.thodi@...wei.com>,
"lulu@...hat.com" <lulu@...hat.com>,
"suravee.suthikulpanit@....com" <suravee.suthikulpanit@....com>,
"iommu@...ts.linux.dev" <iommu@...ts.linux.dev>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>,
"Duan, Zhenzhong" <zhenzhong.duan@...el.com>,
"Martins, Joao" <joao.m.martins@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 3/7] iommufd: Add iommufd_device_bind_pasid()
On 2023/11/8 16:46, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> From: Liu, Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 8, 2023 3:45 PM
>>
>> On 2023/10/10 16:19, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>>>> From: Liu, Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
>>>> Sent: Monday, October 9, 2023 4:51 PM
>>>>
>>>> +struct iommufd_device *iommufd_device_bind_pasid(struct
>> iommufd_ctx
>>>> *ictx,
>>>> + struct device *dev,
>>>> + u32 pasid, u32 *id)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct iommufd_device *idev;
>>>> + int rc;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * iommufd always sets IOMMU_CACHE because we offer no way for
>>>> userspace
>>>> + * to restore cache coherency.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (!device_iommu_capable(dev, IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY))
>>>> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * No iommu supports pasid-granular msi message today. Here we
>>>> + * just check whether the parent device can do safe interrupts.
>>>> + * Isolation between virtual devices within the parent device
>>>> + * relies on the parent driver to enforce.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (!iommufd_selftest_is_mock_dev(dev) &&
>>>> + !msi_device_has_isolated_msi(dev)) {
>>>> + rc = iommufd_allow_unsafe_interrupts(dev);
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + return ERR_PTR(rc);
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>
>>> Only MemWr w/o pasid can be interpreted as an interrupt message
>>> then we need msi isolation to protect.
>>
>> yes.
>>
>>>
>>> But for SIOV all MemWr's are tagged with a pasid hence can never
>>> trigger an interrupt. From this angle looks this check is unnecessary.
>>
>> But the interrupts out from a SIOV virtual device do not have pasid (at
>> least today). Seems still need a check here if we consider this bind for
>> a SIOV virtual device just like binding a physical device.
>>
>
> this check assumes the device is trusted. as long as there is no way
> for malicious guest to generate arbitrary interrupt messages then
> it's fine.
>
> for physical device a MemWr can be interpreted as interrupt so
> we need msi isolation.
>
> for SIOV all MemWr has pasid then we don't have such worry.
> IMS is under host's control so interrupt messages are already
> sanitized.
sure. this makes sense to me now.:)
--
Regards,
Yi Liu
Powered by blists - more mailing lists