linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <71636309-3bf1-4e7a-b586-c61fea30f7c0@suse.com>
Date:   Tue, 14 Nov 2023 16:36:59 +0200
From:   Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
To:     Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     seanjc@...gle.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
        kys@...rosoft.com, haiyangz@...rosoft.com, wei.liu@...nel.org,
        decui@...rosoft.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org,
        hpa@...or.com, vkuznets@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org,
        ravi.v.shankar@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()



On 8.11.23 г. 20:29 ч., Xin Li wrote:
> Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to have it dump FRED context.
> 
> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>   1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 518e68ee5a0d..b826dc188fc7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6429,7 +6429,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>   	u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
>   	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
> -	u64 tertiary_exec_control;
> +	u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;
>   	unsigned long cr4;
>   	int efer_slot;
>   
> @@ -6440,6 +6440,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
>   	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
> +	secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
> +			       vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
>   	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>   	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>   	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
> @@ -6486,6 +6488,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
>   	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
>   	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {

Shouldn't this be gated on whether FRED is enabled in kvm aka the CPUID 
bit is enumerated ?

<snip>