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Message-ID: <e11b0d18-2f58-4ddd-8f17-309e1a999b61@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2023 20:37:36 +0100
From: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, stefan.bader@...onical.com,
tim.gardner@...onical.com, roxana.nicolescu@...onical.com,
cascardo@...onical.com, kys@...rosoft.com, haiyangz@...rosoft.com,
wei.liu@...nel.org, sashal@...nel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Michael Kelley <mhkelley58@...il.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/tdx: Check for TDX partitioning during early
TDX init
On 29/11/2023 17:40, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 22, 2023 at 06:19:20PM +0100, Jeremi Piotrowski wrote:
>> Which approach do you prefer?
>
> I'm trying to figure out from the whole thread, what this guest is.
Wanted to clarify some things directly here. This type guest is supported
in the kernel already[1], so this whole series is the kind of attempt to
share more code that you advocated for in another email.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230824080712.30327-1-decui@microsoft.com/#t
>
> * A HyperV second-level guest
>From Hyper-V's point of view it's a TDX guest with privilege levels inside, not
second-level...
>
> * of type TDX
...but Intel TDX calls these privilege levels L1 and L2 instead of VMPL0/VMPL1-3.
>
> * Needs to defer cc_mask and page visibility bla...
>
The implementations in tdx_early_init() depend on TDX module calls (not avail)
and the correct calls are standard Hyper-V hypercalls (same as vTOM SNP guests).
> * needs to disable TDX module calls
>
> * stub out tdx_accept_memory
This is actually a fix that for something that only works by accident right now
and I meant to post separately from the rest of the discussion.
If you look at arch/x86/include/asm/unaccepted_memory.h (below), it is used by both
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST and CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT, but there is no tdx_accept_memory
implementation when CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST is not set. This is subtle and confusing,
the stub should be there.
static inline void arch_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end)
{
/* Platform-specific memory-acceptance call goes here */
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)) {
if (!tdx_accept_memory(start, end))
panic("TDX: Failed to accept memory\n");
} else if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) {
snp_accept_memory(start, end);
} else {
panic("Cannot accept memory: unknown platform\n");
}
}
>
> Anything else?
>
> And my worry is that this is going to become a mess and your patches
> already show that it is going in that direction because you need to run
> the TDX side but still have *some* things done differently. Which is
> needed because this is a different type of guest, even if it is a TDX
> one.
>
> Which reminds me, we have amd_cc_platform_vtom() which is a similar type
> of thing.
>
> And the TDX side could do something similar and at least *try* to
> abstract away all that stuff.
>
> Would it be nice? Of course not!
>
> How can one model a virt zoo of at least a dozen guest types but still
> keep code sane... :-\
>
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