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Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 22:56:55 +0800
From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
CC: Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Chao Gao
<chao.gao@...el.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>, "john.allen@....com"
<john.allen@....com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "mlevitsk@...hat.com"
<mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization
On 1/9/2024 11:10 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 08, 2024, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>> On 1/6/2024 12:21 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jan 05, 2024, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>>>> On 1/5/2024 8:54 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Jan 05, 2024, Rick P Edgecombe wrote:
>>>>>>> For CALL/RET (and presumably any branch instructions with IBT?) other
>>>>>>> instructions that are directly affected by CET, the simplest thing would
>>>>>>> probably be to disable those in KVM's emulator if shadow stacks and/or IBT
>>>>>>> are enabled, and let KVM's failure paths take it from there.
>>>>>> Right, that is what I was wondering might be the normal solution for
>>>>>> situations like this.
>>>>> If KVM can't emulate something, it either retries the instruction (with some
>>>>> decent logic to guard against infinite retries) or punts to userspace.
>>>> What kind of error is proper if KVM has to punt to userspace?
>>> KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION. See prepare_emulation_failure_exit().
>>>
>>>> Or just inject #UD into guest on detecting this case?
>>> No, do not inject #UD or do anything else that deviates from architecturally
>>> defined behavior.
>> Thanks!
>> But based on current KVM implementation and patch 24, seems that if CET is exposed
>> to guest, the emulation code or shadow paging mode couldn't be activated at the same time:
> No, requiring unrestricted guest only disables the paths where KVM *delibeately*
> emulates the entire guest code stream. In no way, shape, or form does it prevent
> KVM from attempting to emulate arbitrary instructions.
Yes, also need to prevent sporadic emulation, how about adding below patch in emulator?
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index e223043ef5b2..e817d8560ceb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@
#define IncSP ((u64)1 << 54) /* SP is incremented before ModRM calc */
#define TwoMemOp ((u64)1 << 55) /* Instruction has two memory operand */
#define IsBranch ((u64)1 << 56) /* Instruction is considered a branch. */
+#define IsProtected ((u64)1 << 57) /* Instruction is protected by CET. */
#define DstXacc (DstAccLo | SrcAccHi | SrcWrite)
@@ -4098,9 +4099,9 @@ static const struct opcode group4[] = {
static const struct opcode group5[] = {
F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_inc),
F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_dec),
- I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_call_near_abs),
- I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_call_far),
- I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_jmp_abs),
+ I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_call_near_abs),
+ I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_call_far),
+ I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_jmp_abs),
I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
I(SrcMem | Stack | TwoMemOp, em_push), D(Undefined),
};
@@ -4362,11 +4363,11 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
/* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
I(Stack | SrcImmU16 | Src2ImmByte | IsBranch, em_enter),
I(Stack | IsBranch, em_leave),
- I(ImplicitOps | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch, em_ret_far_imm),
- I(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_ret_far),
- D(ImplicitOps | IsBranch), DI(SrcImmByte | IsBranch, intn),
+ I(ImplicitOps | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_ret_far_imm),
+ I(ImplicitOps | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_ret_far),
+ D(ImplicitOps | IsBranch), DI(SrcImmByte | IsBranch | IsProtected, intn),
D(ImplicitOps | No64 | IsBranch),
- II(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_iret, iret),
+ II(ImplicitOps | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_iret, iret),
/* 0xD0 - 0xD7 */
G(Src2One | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2One, group2),
G(Src2CL | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2CL, group2),
@@ -4382,7 +4383,7 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
I2bvIP(SrcImmUByte | DstAcc, em_in, in, check_perm_in),
I2bvIP(SrcAcc | DstImmUByte, em_out, out, check_perm_out),
/* 0xE8 - 0xEF */
- I(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_call),
+ I(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_call),
D(SrcImm | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
I(SrcImmFAddr | No64 | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
D(SrcImmByte | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
@@ -4401,7 +4402,7 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
/* 0x00 - 0x0F */
G(0, group6), GD(0, &group7), N, N,
- N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_syscall),
+ N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_syscall),
II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_clts, clts), N,
DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, invd), DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, wbinvd), N, N,
N, D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), N, N,
@@ -4432,8 +4433,8 @@ static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdtsc, rdtsc, check_rdtsc),
II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_rdmsr, rdmsr),
IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdpmc, rdpmc, check_rdpmc),
- I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysenter),
- I(ImplicitOps | Priv | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysexit),
+ I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_sysenter),
+ I(ImplicitOps | Priv | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_sysexit),
N, N,
N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
/* 0x40 - 0x4F */
@@ -4971,6 +4972,12 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len, int
if (ctxt->d == 0)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
+ if ((opcode.flags & IsProtected) &&
+ (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_CET)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is active, emulation aborted.\n");
+ return EMULATION_FAILED;
+ }
+
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
if (unlikely(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD) &&
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