linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization

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Message-ID: <ZaSQn7RCRTaBK1bc@chao-email>
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 09:55:43 +0800
From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
To: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
CC: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Rick P Edgecombe
	<rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
	"peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>, "john.allen@....com"
	<john.allen@....com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
	"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "mlevitsk@...hat.com"
	<mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 10:56:55PM +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>On 1/9/2024 11:10 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 08, 2024, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>> > On 1/6/2024 12:21 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> > > On Fri, Jan 05, 2024, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>> > > > On 1/5/2024 8:54 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> > > > > On Fri, Jan 05, 2024, Rick P Edgecombe wrote:
>> > > > > > > For CALL/RET (and presumably any branch instructions with IBT?) other
>> > > > > > > instructions that are directly affected by CET, the simplest thing would
>> > > > > > > probably be to disable those in KVM's emulator if shadow stacks and/or IBT
>> > > > > > > are enabled, and let KVM's failure paths take it from there.
>> > > > > > Right, that is what I was wondering might be the normal solution for
>> > > > > > situations like this.
>> > > > > If KVM can't emulate something, it either retries the instruction (with some
>> > > > > decent logic to guard against infinite retries) or punts to userspace.
>> > > > What kind of error is proper if KVM has to punt to userspace?
>> > > KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION.  See prepare_emulation_failure_exit().
>> > > 
>> > > > Or just inject #UD into guest on detecting this case?
>> > > No, do not inject #UD or do anything else that deviates from architecturally
>> > > defined behavior.
>> > Thanks!
>> > But based on current KVM implementation and patch 24, seems that if CET is exposed
>> > to guest, the emulation code or shadow paging mode couldn't be activated at the same time:
>> No, requiring unrestricted guest only disables the paths where KVM *delibeately*
>> emulates the entire guest code stream.  In no way, shape, or form does it prevent
>> KVM from attempting to emulate arbitrary instructions.
>
>Yes, also need to prevent sporadic emulation, how about adding below patch in emulator?
>
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
>index e223043ef5b2..e817d8560ceb 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
>@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@
> #define IncSP       ((u64)1 << 54)  /* SP is incremented before ModRM calc */
> #define TwoMemOp    ((u64)1 << 55)  /* Instruction has two memory operand */
> #define IsBranch    ((u64)1 << 56)  /* Instruction is considered a branch. */
>+#define IsProtected ((u64)1 << 57)  /* Instruction is protected by CET. */
>
> #define DstXacc     (DstAccLo | SrcAccHi | SrcWrite)
>
>@@ -4098,9 +4099,9 @@ static const struct opcode group4[] = {
> static const struct opcode group5[] = {
>        F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock,              em_inc),
>        F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock,              em_dec),
>-       I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch,       em_call_near_abs),
>-       I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_call_far),
>-       I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch,       em_jmp_abs),
>+       I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_call_near_abs),
>+       I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_call_far),
>+       I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_jmp_abs),
>        I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
>        I(SrcMem | Stack | TwoMemOp,            em_push), D(Undefined),
> };
>@@ -4362,11 +4363,11 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
>        /* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
>        I(Stack | SrcImmU16 | Src2ImmByte | IsBranch, em_enter),
>        I(Stack | IsBranch, em_leave),
>-       I(ImplicitOps | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch, em_ret_far_imm),
>-       I(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_ret_far),
>-       D(ImplicitOps | IsBranch), DI(SrcImmByte | IsBranch, intn),
>+       I(ImplicitOps | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_ret_far_imm),
>+       I(ImplicitOps | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_ret_far),
>+       D(ImplicitOps | IsBranch), DI(SrcImmByte | IsBranch | IsProtected, intn),
>        D(ImplicitOps | No64 | IsBranch),
>-       II(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_iret, iret),
>+       II(ImplicitOps | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_iret, iret),
>        /* 0xD0 - 0xD7 */
>        G(Src2One | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2One, group2),
>        G(Src2CL | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2CL, group2),
>@@ -4382,7 +4383,7 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
>        I2bvIP(SrcImmUByte | DstAcc, em_in,  in,  check_perm_in),
>        I2bvIP(SrcAcc | DstImmUByte, em_out, out, check_perm_out),
>        /* 0xE8 - 0xEF */
>-       I(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_call),
>+       I(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_call),
>        D(SrcImm | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
>        I(SrcImmFAddr | No64 | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
>        D(SrcImmByte | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
>@@ -4401,7 +4402,7 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
> static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
>        /* 0x00 - 0x0F */
>        G(0, group6), GD(0, &group7), N, N,
>-       N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_syscall),
>+       N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_syscall),
>        II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_clts, clts), N,
>        DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, invd), DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, wbinvd), N, N,
>        N, D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), N, N,
>@@ -4432,8 +4433,8 @@ static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
>        IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdtsc, rdtsc, check_rdtsc),
>        II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_rdmsr, rdmsr),
>        IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdpmc, rdpmc, check_rdpmc),
>-       I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysenter),
>-       I(ImplicitOps | Priv | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysexit),
>+       I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_sysenter),
>+       I(ImplicitOps | Priv | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | IsProtected, em_sysexit),
>        N, N,
>        N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
>        /* 0x40 - 0x4F */
>@@ -4971,6 +4972,12 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len, int
>        if (ctxt->d == 0)
>                return EMULATION_FAILED;
>+       if ((opcode.flags & IsProtected) &&
>+           (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_CET)) {

CR4.CET doesn't necessarily mean IBT or shadow stack is enabled. why not check
CPL and IA32_S/U_CET?

>+               WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is active, emulation aborted.\n");

remove this WARN_ONCE(). Guest can trigger this at will and overflow host dmesg.

if you really want to tell usespace the emulation_failure is due to CET, maybe
you can add a new flag like KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION_FLAG_INSTRUCTION_BYTES.
for now, I won't bother to add this because probably userspace just terminates
the VM on any instruction failure (i.e., won't try to figure out the reason of
the instruction failure and fix it).